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CLASS CERTIFICATION AND THE
SUBSTANTIVE MERITS
ROBERT G. BONE†
DAVID S. EVANS††
ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court, in its 1974 decision, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, held that judges should not conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit as part of the decision whether to
certify a class. The federal courts have struggled ever since to honor
Eisen’s bar while still conducting a credible certification analysis—a
task complicated by the fact that merits-related factors are often relevant to Rule 23 requirements. The result is a muddled body of case
law in which courts tend to certify generously and avoid inquiring
into the merits of substantive issues even when those issues are crucial
to the certification analysis. This approach creates high social costs by
inviting frivolous and weak class action suits. This Article argues that
the Eisen rule should be abolished. Trial judges should assess competing evidence, not just allegations, and should evaluate case strength
whenever the specific requirements of Rule 23 call for an inquiry into
merits-related factors. For example, a party relying on a substantive
issue to show commonality or predominance should have to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the issue. The Article also goes further and recommends that judges always conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits before certifying a class, regardless of whether
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merits-related factors are directly relevant to a specific requirement of
Rule 23.
The Article first reviews the history of the Eisen rule and surveys
the current state of the law, before turning to a policy analysis of the
rule’s effects. The policy discussion criticizes the traditional arguments and then offers a systematic evaluation of error and process
costs. Error costs must be evaluated in light of the extremely high
probability of postcertification settlement. Eisen’s liberal approach
creates a substantial risk of erroneous certification grants that cannot
be corrected later when a case settles. This risk coupled with the high
likelihood of settlement invites frivolous and weak class action suits.
The result is a serious error-cost problem with regard to certification.
At the same time, requiring a merits review at the certification stage
increases the risk of erroneous certification denials. But for several
reasons this risk is not likely to increase dramatically, and the associated costs are not likely to be large. The net result therefore supports a
merits inquiry, and this conclusion remains valid even after process
costs are added to the policy mix.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the United States Supreme Court decided Eisen v.
1
Carlisle & Jacquelin in 1974, it has been widely accepted doctrine
that a judge should not “conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits
of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action.”2 Courts have applied this rule generally to bar merits-related
3
inquiries at the certification stage. Yet few of these courts offer any
convincing rationale for the rule’s broad application.
4
It is time to reexamine the Eisen rule. The rule was only thinly
justified at the time Eisen endorsed it, and developments since Eisen

1. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
2. Id. at 177.
3. See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 291 (2d Cir. 1999)
(admonishing that “a motion for class certification is not an occasion for examination of the
merits of the case”); Koch v. Stanard, 962 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1992) (urging that courts “decide promptly whether the case should proceed as a representative action, without regard to the
virtues of the plaintiffs’ legal theory”); In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192
F.R.D. 68, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that a court “is not permitted to indulge ‘dueling’ between opposing experts at the class certification stage”); Or. Laborers-Employers Health &
Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 365, 370, 372 (D. Or. 1998) (quoting the
language of Eisen to justify certification of a class without conducting a preliminary inquiry); 7B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1785, at 122–28 (2d ed. 1986) (acknowledging the impropriety of preliminary
hearings on the merits as part of class certifications). In Eisen, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary
review to shift notice costs to the defendants and facilitate class certification. 417 U.S. at 178–79.
More typically, it is the defendants who would want a preliminary review to oppose class certification.
4. Others have criticized the Eisen rule, but no one has yet offered a thorough analysis.
See generally, e.g., Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative
for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 312–15 (1980)
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have weakened the justification even further. The strategic dynamics
of the modern class action—and especially the prevalence of settlement—counsel in favor of a rigorous review of the substantive merits
and the likelihood of success at the certification stage. Loose certification standards risk high costs by inviting frivolous class action suits
that defendants settle rather than face potentially crippling, even
bankrupting, damage awards.
Not only is the Eisen rule weakly justified, it is applied unevenly.
In some cases, federal judges invoke the rule to ignore merits-related
evidence and to facilitate certification. In other cases, judges profess
fidelity to the rule while selectively violating it in practice. The result
is a patchwork of discretionary decisions difficult to justify on principled grounds.
We argue that there is no sound reason to retain the Eisen rule in
its current form. We make two suggestions for reform, one modest
and the other more ambitious. Our modest proposal would require
district court judges to assess all the competing evidence and evaluate
the strength of the case whenever the specific requirements of the
5
federal class action rule, Rule 23, call for an inquiry into merits6
related factors. Our more ambitious proposal would require a pre(advocating some form of merit review in damage class actions); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Class
Certification Based on Merits of the Claims, 69 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that a precertification inquiry into the merits is consistent with
the class action, notwithstanding Eisen, and proposing that a sample of cases be tried before
class certification to help the parties value the class claims as a whole); Bartlett H. McGuire,
The Death Knell for Eisen: Why the Class Action Analysis Should Include an Assessment of the
Merits, 168 F.R.D. 366 (1996) (recommending a preliminary merits review for damage class actions); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26
J. LEG. STUD. 521 (1997) (criticizing Eisen on the ground that it encourages reliance on procedural controls of mass tort class actions when substantive controls, including a precertification
merits review, would be superior); Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave:
Some Problems of Judges in Dealing with Class Action Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369, 381–82
(1995) (criticizing the Eisen rule as not applicable to preliminary investigations into the merits
of a settlement, and emphasizing the importance of a merits review in mass tort settlement class
actions).
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
6. To certify a class action under Rule 23, the class must meet the four requirements set
out in Rule 23(a) and also fit within one of the three pigeonholes in Rule 23(b). For a discussion
of these certification requirements, see 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, §§ 1751–
1780.
In particular, according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), the class must be “so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1); there must be
“questions of law or fact common to the class,” id. 23(a)(2); the claims of the representative parties must be “typical of the claims . . . of the class,” id. 23(a)(3); and it must be the case that “the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” id. 23(a)(4).

BONE.DOC

2002]

03/18/02 3:22 PM

CLASS CERTIFICATION

1255

liminary inquiry into the merits in every case, regardless of whether
merits-related factors are directly relevant to a specific requirement
of Rule 23.
These proposals, which can be implemented by amending Rule
23, are strongly supported by a careful analysis of the costs and benefits of the certification decision. In many cases, the mere decision to
certify creates intense pressure for defendants to settle, and this settlement leverage makes the class action attractive to plaintiffs with
frivolous and weak claims. A threshold merits review will help deter
this form of class action abuse. Indeed, it also should deter plaintiffs
from playing a “shell game,” shopping for theories that are especially
conducive to class certification but weak on the facts, expecting at the
summary judgment or trial stage to switch to stronger theories that
never could meet certification requirements.

These four requirements are commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and
representational adequacy. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, §§ 1762–1765, at 151,
198, 228, 263.
The class action also must qualify for one of the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). These
three categories identify three different reasons for class action treatment. Focusing on plaintiff
classes, which are by far the most common kind of class action and the one that we are concerned about in this article, the Rule 23(b) subdivisions deal with the following situations: First,
certification is proper under subdivision 23(b)(1) when separate litigation of individual suits
risks imposing especially unfair burdens on the defendant or other class members. Separate adjudications must risk subjecting the defendant to “inconsistent or varying adjudications . . .
which would establish incompatible standards of conduct,” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A), or
“would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties . . . or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests,” id. 23(b)(1)(B).
Second, certification is proper under subdivision (b)(2) for a class, such as a civil rights
class, that seeks class-wide injunctive relief and is therefore homogeneous and cohesive from the
remedial point of view. In the language of subdivision 23(b)(2), the defendant must have “acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Id.
23(b)(2).
Third, certification is proper under subdivision 23(b)(3) when collective adjudication
promises substantial efficiency benefits or makes it possible for class members with small claims
to bring suit and enforce the substantive law. In the language of subdivision 23(b)(3), the court
must find “that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members [(the “predominance requirement”)], and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy [(the “superiority requirement”)].” Id. 23(b)(3).
Of these 23(a) and 23(b) certification requirements, commonality, typicality, and (b)(3)
predominance and superiority most clearly invite a merits-related inquiry, as we discuss below.
See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. In addition, a merits review is sometimes appropriate when evaluating representational adequacy and the requirements of (b)(1)(B), especially
in “limited fund” situations.
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A reexamination of the Eisen rule is timely for a number of reasons. First, in recent months, some federal appellate courts have begun to take a closer look at the rule, and the resulting decisions accen7
tuate a circuit conflict over the rule’s scope and its desirability. For
example, a panel of the Seventh Circuit in Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.,8 recently rejected the Eisen rule as a bar to a merits inquiry when the merits are relevant to one of Rule 23’s certification
requirements, and the Third Circuit seems to be taking a similar approach.9 In contrast, the Second Circuit reiterated its support for
10
Eisen in Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad. The Caridad
court held that the district judge improperly considered competing
expert testimony dealing with merits-related issues when he denied
certification—even though the testimony was crucial to the viability
of the only common questions at issue and even though the appellate
court itself admitted to doubts about the truth of the plaintiffs’ factual
allegations.11 The Caridad decision already has had considerable in-

7. Some of these decisions have been made possible by new Rule 23(f), which was added
to Rule 23 in 1998. Rule 23(f) authorizes discretionary interlocutory appeals from certification
decisions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), advisory committee’s note (1998) (observing that with the
adoption of subdivision (f), “[a]ppeal from an order granting or denying class certification is
permitted in the sole discretion of the court of appeals”). Prior to Rule 23(f), certification decisions could be appealed only at the end of the case (with very limited exceptions). Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978). Since most class actions settled soon after certification, few certification decisions ever reached the federal appellate courts. By authorizing discretionary interlocutory appeals, the new Rule 23(f) increases the opportunities for appellate
review of traditional class action doctrines such as the Eisen rule. See Michael E. Solimine &
Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review
by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1537
(2000) (addressing “the appellate courts’ new power to grant a discretionary appeal of class certification decisions” under Rule 23(f)).
8. 249 F.3d 672, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that where certification requirements
overlap with the merits a judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits). The Szabo
decision was handed down on May 4, 2001. Id. at 672.
9. See Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 185–89 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting the
importance of looking beyond the plaintiff’s allegations to the underlying evidence to determine
predominance); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167–69
(3d Cir. 2001) (observing that concerns about class actions have become more serious since the
Eisen decision and that as a result “a preliminary inquiry into the merits is sometimes necessary
to determine whether the alleged claims can be properly resolved as a class action”).
10. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
11. Id. at 291–93. On remand after reversal, the district judge again denied class certification, this time on the ground that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) were not satisfied. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 197 F.R.D. 85, 88–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). The
Second Circuit reversed this decision as well. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 267
F.3d 147, 154 (2d Cir. 2001).
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fluence in the lower courts.12 Some observers see in these conflicting
cases a developing split in the federal circuits, a split that the United
States Supreme Court might have to resolve.13
In addition to these developments, the Advisory Committee on
14
Civil Rules currently is considering revisions to Rule 23. As one of
its revisions, the Committee should include a provision overturning
Eisen and requiring a preliminary merits review at the certification
stage. If the recent decisions from the Seventh and Third Circuits signal a broader trend, it is possible that this reform might be implemented without a formal amendment to Rule 23, at least to the extent
of our modest proposal. Nevertheless, the Committee should act to
ensure this result. Moreover, it is not clear that federal judges have
the power to implement our more ambitious proposal on their own,
for a preliminary merits review in all cases might require express
authorization in Rule 23. If so, then either the Advisory Committee
will have to amend Rule 23, or Congress will have to legislate the
change independent of Committee action.
Our analysis also relates to one of the most far-reaching trends in
modern procedural law: the growing importance of settlement to the
15
design of procedural rules. The Eisen case was decided at a time
when settlement did not figure as prominently in procedural design as
it does today. Over the past three decades, settlement has emerged as
a central goal of the federal courts: judges encourage it, procedural

12. At least eight courts in the Second Circuit so far have relied on Caridad to certify
classes over the defendant’s objection. See infra note 241 (collecting citations). One of those
cases is a major antitrust class action involving approximately four million retailers and billions
of dollars in damages. In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 79–80
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding, in reliance on Caridad, that conflicting expert testimony cannot be
considered at the certification stage, even though critically relevant to class certification issues).
The Second Circuit recently affirmed the district judge’s certification decision in the VISA
Check/MasterMoney case and once again refused to resolve a critical dispute between experts.
In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480, at
*18–*19 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001).
13. See Lorna G. Schofield & Jeffrey S. Jacobson, Circuits Split on Factual Disputes in
Class Actions, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 2001, at 1 (wondering whether the Supreme Court will step in
to resolve the circuit split).
14. See Federal Rulemaking: Proposed Rules Amendments Published for Comment, at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules1.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
15. For a description of some of these developments, see Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 933–37
(2000) (tying the shifting role of Article III judges to the evolution of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
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rules facilitate it, and scholars write about it extensively.16 As we shall
see, the significance of the certification decision appears quite different if one looks at the class action as a device for settlement rather
than as a mechanism for collective adjudication.
This Article is divided into six Parts. Part I describes the historical background that led up to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Eisen rule in 1974, and Part II summarizes the almost thirty-year history of the rule’s application.
Part III takes a critical look at the rule in view of its historical
and doctrinal background. It criticizes the Eisen Court’s original rationale and examines other efforts to justify the rule. Part III concludes with a careful analysis of the most convincing justification: that
the Eisen rule reduces the error cost of mistaken denials of certification and the process cost of expensive evidentiary inquiries at the certification stage. As it turns out, this argument is based on flawed assumptions, and once those assumptions are corrected, it becomes
apparent that the cost-benefit balance in fact supports a preliminary
review of the merits.
Part IV applies our analysis to a concrete case, Caridad v. MetroNorth Commuter Railroad. This Part explains why the Second Circuit
should have allowed a preliminary evaluation of the merits even
though doing so required the district judge to review complex expert
testimony and technical factual questions. Part IV also illustrates how
our proposed alternative would work in practice.
Part V is a brief discussion of our more ambitious proposal. The
discussion is brief because the analysis is already presented in previous Parts. The error- and process-cost arguments developed in Part
III have implications beyond the certification standards of the current
16. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340–46 (positing that, “[o]ver the past five decades,
first state and then federal judges have embraced active promotion of settlement as a major
component of the judicial role”); Resnik, supra note 15, at 927–28 & n.11, 947–49, 995 (noting
the judicial commitment to promoting settlement, and observing that, “[a]s an educational and
rulemaking organization, the federal judiciary has adopted an anti-adjudication and prosettlement agenda”). In recent decades, court-annexed alternative dispute resolution has become an important tool for encouraging settlement. See Edward F. Sherman, The Impact on
Litigation Strategy of Integrating Alternative Dispute Resolution into the Pretrial Process, 168
F.R.D. 75, 75–77 (1996) (focusing on the possible procedural compatibility of alternative dispute
resolution and trials). In 1998, Congress adopted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 105
Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (1998) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2000)), which requires each federal district to furnish an alternative dispute resolution process (such as mediation, early neutral evaluation, or mini-trial), id. § 3(b), 112 Stat. at 2994, and requires the parties
in every case at least to consider using the process provided, id. § 4(a), 112 Stat. at 2994.
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Rule 23. A careful balance of the costs and benefits of the Eisen rule
strongly suggests the desirability of reforming class action law to require a merits review as a separate and independent condition of certification in all cases.
I. HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A. Birth of the Certification Procedure
Rule 23, the federal class action rule, was adopted in 193817 and
18
almost completely revised in 1966. The original version was highly
formalistic. It linked class treatment to the abstract character of the
legal rights at stake. A class action was permissible when the rights
alleged were “joint,” “common,” or “secondary,” but not when they
were “several” unless united by a “common question” and “common
19
relief.”
The 1966 revision of Rule 23 eliminated the focus on rights and
adopted a more pragmatic approach. The new rule recognized four
functional reasons for class treatment: to prevent serious litigation20
related unfairness to the defendant or class members, to assure re-

17. See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1752, at 15 (summarizing class actions under the original Rule 23).
18. See id. § 1753, at 41 (summarizing changes to Rule 23 in 1966).
19. The 1938 version of Rule 23 read in relevant part:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will
fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be
sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
Id. § 1753, at 5 n.1.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1):
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
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medial efficacy,21 to aid in substantive law enforcement,22 and to promote litigation efficiency.23 The shift to a pragmatic approach opened
up new possibilities for the class action and led to greatly expanded
use of the device. For example, the 1966 drafters created a novel type
of class action in subdivision (b)(3), the purpose of which was to further the twin policies of efficiency and substantive norm enforce24
ment.

not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests.
An example of (b)(1)(A) is a case in which the defendant might face inconsistent injunctive orders issuing from different courts if individual class members were allowed to sue separately. An
example of (b)(1)(B) is a case in which the defendant has insufficient funds to satisfy all the individual judgments, so some class members would receive no recovery at all if class members
litigated separately. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, §§ 1772–1774
(reviewing ways in which separate claims might adversely affect class members or the opposing
party).
21. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2):
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.
The most commonly cited example of a (b)(2) class action is a civil rights case asking for broad
class-wide injunctive relief, where class status is meant to assist the court in crafting an effective
remedy. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, §§ 1775–1776 (noting the
applicability of this subsection to civil rights cases).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3):
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
This provision mainly covers damage actions that do not involve the sort of unfairness concerns
that trigger Rule 23(b)(1). There are two paradigmatic situations that fall under Rule 23(b)(3).
One is a case like securities fraud and antitrust, in which individual claims are too small to justify separate suits and in which without a class action the substantive law would be underenforced. In these cases, the class action facilitates aggregation of all the small claims into a single whole that has large enough damages to attract competent class counsel. The second paradigm for Rule 23(b)(3) is a case like a mass tort, in which most plaintiffs have large individual
claims but the claims have many overlapping legal and factual issues. The class action in these
cases primarily serves efficiency goals by avoiding duplicative litigation of the common issues.
See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, §§ 1777–1780 (discussing the different types of, reasons for, and requirements for (b)(3) class actions).
23. See supra note 22 (acknowledging the import of efficiency).
24. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1777 (discussing the purpose and background of 23(b)(3)).
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These changes focused attention on the certification stage. Prior
25
to 1966, Rule 23 made no explicit reference to certification at all. Although subdivision (a) of Rule 23 specified conditions for a class action, nothing in the 1938 Rule expressly required any kind of formal
certification procedure.26 Moreover, the rights typology of Rule 23(a),
in theory at least, required only an inspection of the formal legal
27
structure of the suit and not an inquiry into the facts.
The 1966 revision of Rule 23 took a different approach and in so
doing turned certification into a critical stage of class action litigation.
Whereas class actions under the 1938 version of Rule 23 did not al28
ways bind absent class members, class actions under the 1966 revi-

25. See 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.50, at 23-884.4
(2d ed. 1996) (noting that the original Rule 23 had no counterpart to current subdivision (c)(1),
which requires a formal certification decision).
26. See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 284 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987))
(acknowledging that before 1966, a judge usually had occasion to make a determination of certification only if the defendant raised an objection to plaintiff’s failure to join class members as
necessary parties).
27. See John G. Harkins, Jr., Comment, Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 705, 709 (1997) (embracing the notion that the determination of membership in the class
and adequacy of representation were relatively straightforward for (a)(1) and (a)(2) class actions under the 1938 version of Rule 23). Significantly, the nineteenth- and early-twentiethcentury precedent, on which the rule drafters relied, largely presumed adequate representation.
See Annotation, Right to Control of Class Suit, 91 A.L.R. 587, 587–88 (1933) (demonstrating
that representational adequacy was put in question only with specific evidence of bad faith); see
also Bone, supra note 26, at 285 (describing the absolute dominion view of representative litigation, which meant that the represented party had unilateral decisionmaking power). However,
the formal rights categories created some confusion in practical application. See, e.g.,
ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 244–73 (1950) (decrying the finite and
exclusive list of remedies available under Rule 23 for narrowing the applicability of the rule).
28. Nothing in the text of original Rule 23 referred to res judicata. Moreover, a key architect of the rule, James William Moore, advocated res judicata effect only for some class actions.
See James William Moore & Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions—Jurisdiction and Effect of
Judgment, 32 U. ILL. L. REV. 555, 556–62 (1938) (postulating that res judicata applies only in
limited cases, including public rights suits). For much of its history, the class action—or “representative suit” as it was called prior to 1938—was conceived not as a device to bind absentees,
but as a way to permit an individual suit to go forward over the objection that necessary parties
had not been joined. Bone, supra note 26, at 243–84. Whether the absent parties also would be
bound by the judgment rendered in the individual suit depended on the law of res judicata and
was not an automatic consequence of a properly brought class action. Id. at 257–84. Eventually,
courts and commentators began to link class action doctrine to the res judicata rules, and with
this linkage the class action gradually came to be seen as a binding device. Id. at 279–82. Still,
not all class actions produced binding judgments. The 1938 version of Rule 23 embodied this
mixed scheme—the Rule itself reserved judgment on preclusive effects and courts recognized
preclusion only in some situations. Id. at 289 n.180.
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sion were all meant to have full res judicata effect. The 1966 Rule
drafters made perfectly clear—and for the first time—that the entire
point of the class action procedure was to adjudicate individual claims
in one proceeding with full binding effect on each and every class
member.29
Firmly linking the class action to res judicata in this way dramatically increased the stakes for absent class members and placed greater
responsibility on the judge and more weight on the certification process. With res judicata at stake from the beginning of the suit, it became especially important to make sure that the case satisfied the requirements for class treatment. Accordingly, the 1966 Rule drafters
included an express provision in Rule 23(c)(1) establishing a formal
certification procedure: the judge had to determine “[a]s soon as
practicable after commencement of an action brought as a class ac30
tion” whether the suit is to be maintained as such.
Over the years since 1966, the certification decision has taken on
great strategic importance. For the class attorney, certification can
mean the difference between a huge fee and no fee at all. Even in
relatively routine cases, class attorneys earn hundreds of thousands,
31
and frequently millions, of dollars in fees. For class members, a favorable certification decision can mean greater litigating power and
enhanced settlement leverage. And, for the defendant, certification
can mean the difference between facing a massive and essentially
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s note, subdivision (c)(3) (1966); 7B WRIGHT,
MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1789, at 246. Still, a court cannot prejudge res judicata effect.
A later court in a suit by an absentee class member is free to reject the res judicata effect of the
earlier class action because of some defect in the way the class action was handled. See id.
§ 1789, at 244–47.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
31. A Federal Judicial Center study of class actions in four federal districts found mean fee
awards in excess of one million dollars in three of the four districts studied and a mean of
$732,537 in the fourth district. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 148 fig. 69 (1996) (reporting additionally that median fee awards
in the four districts were $667,500; $660,000; $959,901; and $1,500,000). Although an extreme
example, many class attorneys in the state tobacco cases earned tens of millions of dollars in
fees. For example, Kurzweil v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 94 Civ. 2373, No. 94 Civ. 2546, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18378, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1999), a class action alleging securities fraud
through the concealment of nicotine’s addictiveness, generated $37.1 million in attorneys’ fees.
$37.1 Million in Fees Ok’d in Securities Case, MEALEY’S ATTORNEY FEES, Dec. 1999. Ramos v.
Philip Morris Cos., 743 So. 2d 24, 32–33 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999), a class action on behalf of flight
attendants alleging harm from second-hand smoke, generated $46 million in attorneys’ fees and
$3 million in costs. Florida Appeals Court Affirms Settlement in Broin Class Action, TOBACCO
INDUSTRY LITIG. REP., Apr. 9, 1999, at 7.
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uninsurable liability risk in one suit or a more manageable series of
risks in individual suits.32 Because the strategic implications are so
substantial, parties today invest a great deal in litigating certification
33
motions.
B. Early Confrontation with the Merits Issue
The 1966 revision of Rule 23 led to heightened concerns about
frivolous class action litigation, especially in connection with the
34
novel damages class action authorized by subdivision (b)(3). In the
1970s, Congress adopted legislation that expanded the availability of
consumer class actions under (b)(3).35 This development, coupled with
use of the (b)(3) class action in antitrust, securities, and environmental cases, prompted industry complaints about the mounting burdens of class litigation and particularly about frivolous class action
36
suits.
At least one judge responded to these concerns by screening the
37
merits at the certification stage. In Dolgow v. Anderson, Judge
Weinstein refused to certify a class unless the plaintiffs could show,
after limited discovery and a preliminary review of the evidence, that
32. We examine these points in some detail in Part III.D.
33. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 8–9, 36–39 (presenting data on certification
disputes). Many of Rule 23’s requirements are sufficiently open-ended to invite a great deal of
adversarial conflict at the certification stage, especially in cases with high stakes. For example,
Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement asks a court to engage in the necessarily imprecise task of
determining whether the claims of the representative parties arise from the same event or conduct and are based on the same legal theory as those of the class. E.g., In re American Med.
Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1082 (6th Cir. 1996). Also, Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy-of-representation
requirement calls for an inquiry into possible conflicts of interest between the class and class
representatives or class counsel, issues over which parties can sharply disagree. Furthermore, a
court applying Rule 23(b) must make discretionary determinations about such things as the existence of a limited fund under (b)(1)(B) and the predominance of common questions and superiority of the class action under (b)(3). See, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D.
271, 285–86 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (examining the application of 23(b)(1)(B) to a subclass seeking a
medical monitoring remedy).
34. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 15–16 (2000) (acknowledging a history of criticism of Rule
23(b)(3)).
35. Id. at 16–17. For example, the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667e (2000),
was amended in 1976 to take account of the special problems raised by class actions under that
statute. See generally William E. Knepper, The Superiority Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) in
Class Actions Under the Truth in Lending Act, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 291 (1976) (tracing the litigation
spurred by the Truth in Lending Act and the 1996 amendment to Rule 23).
36. For an account of these events and the heated controversy that ensued after the 1966
revision, see HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 15–20.
37. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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the class claims had a significant chance of succeeding at trial.38 However, not everyone was happy with the screening approach. Some
judges objected on the grounds that there was no express authorization in the language of Rule 23 and that an early merits determination
might prejudice the losing party’s chances later in the case.39
C. The Eisen Decision
The United States Supreme Court faced the screening issue in
40
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin. The Eisen case alleged violations of
the antitrust and securities laws and was brought against securities
brokers on behalf of a class of approximately six million odd lot trad41
ers on the New York Stock Exchange. Most class members had too
little at stake to justify an individual suit. Thus, the class action was
42
the only practical means to obtain a private remedy for everyone.
The trial judge, concerned that individual notice to all class
members would be too costly given the small claims, devised a novel
43
procedure for allocating notice costs. He held a preliminary hearing
on the merits and, on the strength of a favorable merits review, allo44
cated ninety percent of the notice costs to the defendants. The Court
45
of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeals, holding that the trial judge had no authority to undertake a
46
preliminary inquiry into the merits at the certification stage.
The Supreme Court justified its holding on three grounds. First,
and most important, the Court reasoned that Rule 23 did not clearly

38. Id. at 501 (embracing the potential efficiency gains of a preliminary hearing, and decrying the potential harm to the defendant from an erroneous certification decision, including
the adverse effect of class notice and the strong settlement pressure of a certified class action).
39. In the same year that Judge Weinstein endorsed a merits review, Judge Metzner of the
Southern District of New York rejected it. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting concerns about the effect of a premature merits determination and
reservations about the scope of judicial power to engage in early factual inquiries); accord
Miller v. Mackey Int’l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427–30 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
41. Id. at 166.
42. See id. at 161 (“Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action
or not at all.”).
43. Rule 23(c)(2) requires “individual notice to all [class] members who can be identified
through reasonable effort” in a (b)(3) class action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
44. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
45. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177.
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47

authorize a preliminary merits review. Moreover, the delay involved
in holding a hearing was inconsistent with Rule 23(c)(1)’s requirement that the certification decision be made “[a]s soon as practicable
48
after the commencement of [the] action.” Second, the Court worried
about potential prejudice from a determination made without the
usual trial safeguards, which might “color the subsequent proceedings
49
and place an unfair burden on the defendant.” Third, the Court expressed concern that a preliminary evaluation would give the representative plaintiffs the benefit of a class action—a determination of
the merits of the class claims—before they established the require50
ments for certification.
The Court did not limit its holding to the unusual facts of the
case, in which the plaintiffs sought and the defendants opposed the
preliminary merits review. Instead, it used expansive and seemingly
categorical language that has had a profound effect on class action
practice ever since:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that
gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained
as a class action. Indeed, such a procedure contravenes the
51
Rule . . . .

II. EVALUATING THE MERITS AFTER EISEN
Eisen quickly came to stand for a general rule prohibiting any
52
preliminary investigation of the merits at the certification stage.
Courts applied this rule across the board, not just to cases like Eisen
in which an investigation benefited the plaintiff class by allowing notice costs to be shifted, but also, and much more frequently, to cases
in which an investigation would benefit the defendant by screening

47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)).
49. Id. at 177.
50. See id. at 178–79 (holding that the plaintiff must pay the cost of notice as part of his
burden).
51. Id. at 177.
52. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the
Court cannot hold a preliminary hearing into the merits, that the judge must accept plaintiffs’
allegations as true, and that the fact that the plaintiffs might not be able to prove allegations is
not a ground for denying certification).
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out frivolous or weak class action suits.53 Even today, almost thirty
years after the decision, courts commonly cite Eisen for a general rule
barring a preliminary merits inquiry and requiring a certification
54
analysis focused on allegations rather than evidence.
This simple statement of the Eisen rule, however, does not accurately reflect the way the substantive merits figure in certification decisions today. In fact, judges sometimes do probe behind the allegations and examine supporting evidence to determine whether Rule
55
23’s requirements are satisfied. The Supreme Court even endorsed
this practice in its 1982 decision, General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,56 discussed in Section A. Eisen, however, continues to
be strong precedent and has produced a large body of case law in
which lower court judges stop short of making the sort of merits inquiry required for a sound certification analysis.
53. As the cases discussed in this Part illustrate, the Eisen rule is used today to avoid inquiring into the merits in connection with decisions to certify a class. See infra Part II.B.
54. See, e.g., Koch v. Stanard, 962 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the trial judge
must accept the allegations of the complaint as true when deciding whether certification is appropriate); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656, 661 n.15 (2d Cir. 1978)
(same); Kupfer v. Goodman, No. CV-97-3894, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7951, at *6 (E.D.N.Y.
May 17, 2000) (“Courts must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and should avoid
preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case.”); In re Great S. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices
Litig., 192 F.R.D. 212, 215 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“[T]he court presumes the truth of Plaintiffs’ allegations for the purposes of this opinion . . . .”) (citations omitted); Alexander v. Q.T.S. Corp.,
No. 98-C3234, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11842, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1999) (“For purposes of
determining certification, allegations made in the complaint are taken as true and the merits of
the claim are not considered.”); Medine v. Wash. Mut., FA, 185 F.R.D. 366, 369 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(“The court takes the factual allegations stated in the complaint as true . . . .”). These principles
are also combined in some cases with the additional observation that doubts should be resolved
in favor of certification, especially as the judge has power to decertify later in the suit if facts
show certification was improvidently granted. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996,
1011 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing the manageability of the class, and stressing that “certification is
conditional” and that “[w]hen, and if, the district court is convinced that the litigation cannot be
managed, decertification is proper”); Council of & for the Blind of Del. County Valley, Inc. v.
Regan, 709 F.2d 1521, 1546 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that “[b]etter it is, in any sort of case,
to utilize class certification liberally when suit-dismissals would chance the loss of a meritorious
claim forever,” because the court can amend the certification order later); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 493 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“[E]ven though this case may present a close
question as to whether this action should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), the Court will grant
certification because the Court may amend the certification order before a decision on the merits . . . .”); 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1785, at 128–31 (noting that the power
to decertify has “encouraged many courts to be quite liberal in certifying a class . . . at an early
stage”).
55. See, e.g., In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (noting that the
court may consider evidence relevant to the requirements of Rule 23 even though that evidence
also may relate to the merits of the case).
56. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
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A. The Falcon Decision
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon was an employment discrimination suit brought by a Mexican-American em57
ployee of General Telephone. Alleging racial discrimination, the
plaintiff sought to represent a class consisting of employees like himself who were denied promotion, as well as applicants for employ58
ment who were not hired. The plaintiff argued that his allegation of
racial discrimination in promotion was enough to support an acrossthe-board attack on all of General Telephone’s discriminatory practices, including those practices, such as hiring, that did not affect him
personally.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court held that
the commonality and typicality prongs of Rule 23(a) require more
59
than a mere allegation of racial discrimination. They require some
common thread connecting the otherwise distinct discriminatory
practices, for example, a single tainted policy or biased testing proce60
dure that affects hiring and promotion in similar ways. Without the
common thread, a class consisting of employees denied promotion
and applicants denied employment would not have sufficient unity to
proceed as a litigating entity. As a result, promotion discrimination
and hiring discrimination would have to be challenged in separate
class action suits.
In the Court’s view, trial judges are supposed to do a “rigorous”
61
analysis of each of Rule 23’s certification requirements. The judge
should not merely accept the plaintiff’s allegation that the Rule is
satisfied; nor in a case like Falcon should she presume commonality
and typicality based simply on an allegation of discrimination. Rule
23 requires a much more intensive certification inquiry:
The District Court’s error in this case . . . is the failure to evaluate
carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a
proper class representative under Rule 23(a). As we noted in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay “the class determination generally involves considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal is-

57. Id. at 149.
58. Id. at 151.
59. Id. at 157.
60. See id. at 158–59 & n.15 (holding that the district court erred in presuming that the
plaintiff’s claim was typical of other claims without identifying common questions of law or
fact).
61. Id. at 161.
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sues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” Sometimes the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine whether the
interests of the absent parties are fairly encompassed within the
named plaintiff’s claim, and sometimes it may be necessary for the
court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the
certification question . . . . [W]e reiterate today that a Title VII class
action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial
court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of
62
Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.

B. Post-Falcon Case Law
Ever since Falcon, the federal courts have struggled to chart a
middle course between Falcon’s requirement of a rigorous analysis
63
and Eisen’s prohibition of a preliminary inquiry into the merits. The
task is particularly difficult because of the close relationship between
the reasons for class action treatment and the substantive character of
64
the case. The certification requirements of Rule 23 force the judge to
think about how the lawsuit will unfold—what substantive issues will
be important and how much of the litigation those issues will consume.
Consider the Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The primary reason for
(b)(3) certification when class members have large claims is the effi65
ciency of adjudicating common questions in a single proceeding. The
62. Id. at 160–61 (citations omitted).
63. See, e.g., Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir. 1993) (cautioning against a preliminary merits inquiry, the court observed that “[w]e have noted that the
‘boundary between a class determination and the merits may not always be easily discernible’”)
(quoting Eggleston v. Chi. Journeyman Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th
Cir. 1981)); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 571–72 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that
courts, when deciding certification, can make “very basic” merits determinations, but should not
resolve “substantial questions of fact going to the merits”); Krueger v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D.
433, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The Court should not resolve any material factual disputes in the
process of determining whether plaintiffs have provided a reasonable basis for their assertions.”) (citation omitted); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) §§ 30.11–.13 (1995)
(noting that the court might need to go beyond the pleadings and allow limited discovery into
the merits to evaluate certification requirements such as typicality, but that it should not “assess
the merits of the underlying claim(s)”).
64. See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274–75 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting the
close “[i]ntertwining of class action inquiry with merits inquiry,” especially for Title VII class
actions, and also noting the resulting dilemma facing trial courts in making “a fair determination
of class action status in advance of trial on the merits,” a problem “for which no happy general
solution has yet been, or is likely to be, found”).
65. See 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1777, at 517 (noting the role that
Rule 23(b)(3) serves in promoting economy).
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two requirements of (b)(3) reflect this purpose: first, common questions must predominate over individual questions, and second, the
class action must be superior to the other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. These two requirements, however, depend upon predictions about the future course of
the lawsuit, and these predictions in turn depend upon assessments,
explicit or implicit, of the relative salience of substantive issues and
supporting evidence.66
To assess predominance, for instance, a judge has to determine
which common questions are serious subjects for litigation and how
much of the litigation will be devoted to resolving them. So too she
must predict which individual questions will loom large, how important they will be, and how much time and energy will be devoted to
litigating them. Indeed, if judges were not willing to inquire into the
merits, parties would have wide latitude to inject frivolous issues to
bolster or undermine a finding of predominance. Plaintiffs, for example, might allege numerous common questions, while defendants
would allege defenses that introduce as many individual issues as possible.67
Thus, judges must predict the likely litigation track of the class
action. But in keeping with Eisen, they must do so without weighing
68
the evidence or predicting likelihood of success. It is not at all clear

66. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
where “some of the considerations under Rule 23(b)(3) [such as the manageability factor for
superiority] overlap the merits . . . then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the
merits”); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 298 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Eisen,
fairly read, does not foreclose consideration of the probable course of the litigation at the class
certification stage.”); Walco Invs., Inc. v. Thenen, 168 F.R.D. 315, 329–30 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (discussing the “evolving nature of the Eisen doctrine” in the Eleventh Circuit, and holding that it is
proper to examine the evidence to determine whether predominance is satisfied but not to determine whether plaintiffs have a meritorious claim). The same thing is true for Rule 23’s other
certification requirements, including commonality, typicality, and at times adequacy of representation.
67. See Mowbray, 208 F.3d at 298 (“We are unwilling to fault a district court for not permitting arguments woven entirely out of gossamer strands of speculation and surmise to tip the
decisional scales in a class certification ruling.”); cf. Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 895 (stressing the importance of a careful district court review, given the parties’, and especially the defendant’s, incentives to manipulate the court’s determination of the certification issues).
68. See In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 178 F.R.D. 603, 618 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(“[T]he Court examines evidence as to how the class proponents intend to prevail at trial, not
whether the facts adduced by the class proponents are susceptible to challenges by class opponents.”) (citation omitted); Gibbs Props. Corp. v. Cigna Corp., 196 F.R.D. 430, 434 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (same); Leszczynski v. Allianz Ins., 176 F.R.D. 659, 675 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (noting that the
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how this can be done. Judges might try to extrapolate from past experience adjudicating cases of the same general type, but this is bound
to be an extremely crude approach. Not only does it reward the strategic pleading of frivolous issues—a special problem for the federal
courts’ liberal notice pleading regime69—but it also ignores factors
specific to particular cases. Because party strategy is quite sensitive to
facts and evidence, case-specific variations can have a large impact on
how cases are litigated and thus on which claims and issues turn out
to be substantial enough to survive the pretrial stage and become a
major part of the trial.
70
Not surprisingly, the resulting dilemma has produced a rather
muddled body of case law. Courts disagree about how closely they
can examine evidence and scrutinize the factual merits at the certifi71
cation stage. Sometimes the certification determination can be made
without the need to probe too deeply. For example, relatively clear
evidence might show sufficient factual heterogeneity to justify denial
of certification. In Reilly v. Gould, Inc.,72 a case involving lead seepage
court must look beyond the complaint to determine whether individual issues will predominate,
but in doing so should not evaluate plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the claims).
69. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 164 (1993) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s application of a heightened pleading system in
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47–48 (1957) (holding that a detailed statement of facts is not required under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
70. See Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 274–75 (4th Cir. 1980) (referring to
the “dilemma” created by Eisen).
71. Purely legal decisions concerning the scope of the substantive law are not particularly
troubling under Eisen as long as the judge accepts all the factual allegations as true. See, e.g.,
Gibbs Props. Corp., 196 F.R.D. at 438–39 (assuming that it is proper to determine at certification whether individual reliance can be presumed as a legal matter on a RICO mail fraud
claim). Indeed, judges routinely make these sorts of decisions when deciding motions to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. Cf. Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675–76 (noting that courts that accept all the
factual allegations as true are treating the certification determination as if it were a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).
Trial judges apparently are willing to entertain motions for summary judgment prior to
deciding on certification—even though doing so has been criticized as inconsistent with a strict
reading of Eisen. See, e.g., Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Under the
proper circumstances—where it is more practicable to do so and where the parties will not suffer significant prejudice—the district court has discretion to rule on a motion for summary
judgment before it decides the certification issue.”); WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 29–31
(noting that, although appeals courts disagree on the appropriateness of ruling on dispositive
motions prior to certification, district judges routinely do so). Some commentators have linked
judicial willingness to consider precertification dispositive motions to judicial discontent with
the Eisen rule. See, e.g., McGuire, supra note 4, at 385, 387–90. In any event, this approach to
merits screening is limited to those relatively rare cases suitable for early summary judgment.
72. 965 F. Supp. 588 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
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from a contaminated site, the trial judge relied on government reports, a database of information about class members, and depositions of plaintiffs and expert witnesses to determine that individual
factual issues of exposure and causation would dominate the litigation
and thus preclude a finding of predominance under (b)(3).73 Along
the way, the judge had to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs’ factual
74
arguments, but the evidence was clear enough to make the task relatively easy.
The more controversial cases are those in which the balance between commonality and individuality is much closer and the evidence
more difficult to evaluate. For example, (a)(2) commonality and
(a)(3) typicality might pivot on a single common question of fact, such
as the existence of a central policy or practice that the plaintiff alleges
produces company-wide discriminatory effects. If the defendant
challenges the plaintiff’s evidence on this common question, the trial
judge must decide how closely to examine the merits. So too, if the
defendant injects an affirmative defense that turns on individual facts,
and the plaintiffs argue that the defense is baseless, the judge once
again must decide how deeply to probe the merits of the defense.
Judges deal with these hard cases in different ways, and it is not
always clear what factors influence the different approaches. Some
judges simply accept the plaintiff’s allegations and evidence no matter
75
how weak, often citing Eisen without any further explanation. Oth76
ers look at the facts more critically. How critically seems to depend

73. Id. at 601–05.
74. See id. at 597 (assuming that lots of factors would be important to determining causation); id. at 600 (assuming that not all plaintiffs would succeed on the medical monitoring claim).
75. See 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1781, at 7–8 (noting that courts are
willing to certify a class on a minimal showing, whenever the assertion of class status is “at least
colorable”); see also Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 188 F.R.D. 365, 370 (D. Or. 1998) (relying on Eisen as reason not to inquire at all into the
merits or to require a trial plan, even though the court expressed doubt about the viability of the
common questions).
76. See Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675–76 (criticizing the district judge for applying a Rule 12(b)(6)
standard to the certification decision, and holding that a preliminary merits inquiry was necessary); Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Mowbray, 208 F.3d 288, 298 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that
the district court properly discounted an individualized waiver defense on the ground that it was
not likely to survive summary judgment, and noting that “a district court must formulate some
prediction as to how specific issues will play out in order to determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given case”); Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584,
599 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court did not engage in an impermissible examination of the merits when it, among other things, discounted the plaintiffs’ allegation of uniform
communications).
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in part on the complexity of the issue. The more difficult the task, the
less likely it is that the judge will carefully probe the evidence.
For example, judges are reluctant to delve into disputes over
complex technical issues or scientific and statistical evidence, at least
when doing so requires weighing competing testimony or evidentiary
77
claims. In Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, an employment discrimination case in which experts disagreed about the relevance of certain statistical evidence crucial to a finding of commonality, the Second Circuit adopted a general rule against resolving
disputes between “dueling experts” at the certification stage.78 And it
did so at the same time that it expressed reservations about the Cari79
dad plaintiffs’ ultimate chance of success. While Caridad is unusual
in formulating a general rule, it is not unusual in its reluctance to
weigh evidence regarding complex issues at the certification stage.80
Another factor that appears to affect willingness to probe the
merits has to do with the judge’s prior beliefs about the value of the
class action. Judges seem more willing to overlook evidentiary weaknesses and certify a class the more strongly they believe in the importance of the class action for enforcement of the substantive law. This
tendency is most evident in small-claim class actions, such as those
based on securities fraud, antitrust violations, or consumer protection
statutes. When plaintiffs have small claims, the class action is often
their only practical means to obtain legal relief, and judges favorably
disposed to using the class action in these cases tolerate a consider-

77. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999). For an in-depth discussion of Caridad, see infra Part IV.
78. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 293 (holding that a court should not delve into the merits of an
expert’s opinion or resolve disputes between dueling experts at the certification stage); see also
In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (same),
aff’d, No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001).
79. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 291 (noting that it might be “extremely difficult” for plaintiffs to
prove their case). For a discussion of the fate of the named plaintiffs’ suits in the aftermath of
Caridad that strongly suggests that many of the cases were dubious, see infra Parts IV.D–E.
80. On the other hand, some courts have been willing to examine evidence, even statistical
evidence, to deny certification in cases in which the defects or inadequacies in the proffered evidence were patent. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Corp., 904 F.2d 1269, 1275–76 (8th Cir.
1990) (affirming a denial of certification in a Title VII case in which the plaintiffs’ statistical and
anecdotal evidence was extremely thin—“too bareboned”—and inconsistent with other clear
data); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 102–04 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming a denial of certification where the plaintiffs’ regression analysis omitted obviously crucial variables and there
was little anecdotal evidence of discrimination); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1555–56
(11th Cir. 1984) (affirming a denial of certification where the plaintiff offered unanalyzed statistics with obvious flaws).
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able degree of uncertainty in the plaintiffs’ legal theories at the certification stage.81
One of the clearest examples of this trend is the securities fraud
class action, especially securities fraud actions that rely on a fraud-onthe-market theory to establish commonality and predominance. The
fraud-on-the-market theory converts materiality, reliance, and damages into common questions and makes it easier for representative
plaintiffs to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).
The theory derives from the efficient capital market hypothesis,
which holds that the market price for securities reflects all material
information, including any public misrepresentations that have
82
wrongfully inflated the price of the company’s stock. As a result,
anyone who buys or sells shares on the open market can be presumed, by virtue of relying on the market price, also to have relied on
the misrepresentations and suffered damage as a proximate result.
Although the fraud-on-the-market theory makes it easier to
show predominance, it also can exacerbate intraclass conflicts and
make it more difficult to satisfy the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of repre83
sentation requirement. One district court squarely confronted this
84
problem in In re Seagate Technology II Securities Litigation. In so

81. See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
903 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (“In light of the importance of the class action device in securities fraud suits, these [Rule 23] factors are to be construed liberally.”) (citation omitted); In re
VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D 68, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (certifying a class
action in an antitrust case despite substantial doubts about the plaintiffs’ ability to prove injury
on a classwide basis, and observing that without class certification, “millions of small merchants
will lose any practical means of obtaining damages”); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186
F.R.D. 403, 419, 424–25, 429 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (evaluating potential intraclass conflicts and representational adequacy in a settlement class action, but refusing, in light of Eisen, to probe the
strength of the subclass claims, and noting that all doubts should be resolved in favor of certifying an antitrust class action because of its important role in private enforcement).
82. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (recognizing a rebuttable presumption based on the fraud-on-the-market theory for Rule 10b-5 actions).
83. For example, suppose plaintiffs complain that the defendant artificially inflated the
price of its stock through misrepresentations. E.g., In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp.
1341, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1994). A plaintiff who bought stock on a particular date and later sold it
has an incentive to maximize the degree of price inflation at the date of purchase to maximize
the amount of his loss and thus his damages. By contrast, a plaintiff who sold stock on the same
date benefits from minimizing price inflation on that date. Id. at 1359–62. Moreover, plaintiffs
who still hold stock at the time of suit have an interest in limiting the amount of damages to
keep the company profitable, whereas plaintiffs who have sold all their shares have an interest
in maximizing damages even if doing so cripples the company. Id. at 1362–64.
84. 843 F. Supp. 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also O’Neil v. Appel, 165 F.R.D. 479, 494–95,
496–98 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (denying class certification due to intraclass conflicts, and holding
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doing, the judge expressly noted the connection between judicial attitudes toward class action policy and liberality at the certification
stage. In particular, he attributed the tendency of previous courts to
downplay intraclass conflicts to “an overarching desire to effectuate
the securities laws and provide relief to small-claim plaintiffs.”85
The Seagate court adopted a stricter approach and held that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary to inquire into potential conflicts.
Since any such hearing would have to probe merits-related factors,
86
such as the level of price inflation and trading volumes, the judge
had to deal with the Eisen rule. He pointed out that Eisen was decided before judicial recognition of the fraud-on-the-market theory
and argued that proper application of Rule 23’s requirements necessitated a preliminary merits determination on the facts of the Seagate
case.87
Subsequent judicial responses to Seagate have been mixed, partly
88
because of differing attitudes toward class action policy. Those
judges who refuse to follow Seagate’s lead seem driven in part by the
same concerns that the Seagate court identified in the precedent it examined. They are inclined to overlook conflicts and avoid examining
the merits out of concern that the predominance requirement, if
taken seriously, would scuttle the class action as a device for enforcing the securities laws and vindicating small claims.89
that Eisen does not bar a hearing on the merits to determine the availability of a fraud-on-themarket theory for Rule 23(b)(3) predominance).
85. Seagate, 843 F. Supp. at 1359.
86. Id. at 1366.
87. Id. at 1367. In fact, a hearing never was held because the plaintiffs responded to the
Seagate opinion by narrowing the class definition to eliminate the potential conflicts. In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 229, 230 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
88. See, e.g., Picard Chem. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v. Perrigo Co., Nos. 1:95-CV-141, 1:95CV-290, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16330, at *24–*27 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 1996) (collecting cases
on both sides and concluding that the majority still certify fraud-on-the-market class actions in
spite of Seagate’s conflicts concerns).
89. See, e.g., In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69–71 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(noting that “[t]he position of the Seagate court is most decidedly the minority position” and
that the Second Circuit has made clear that the Rule 23 requirements should be construed liberally in securities fraud suits); In re Intelligent Elecs., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 92-1905, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1713, at *14–*15 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 1996) (rejecting Seagate’s conflicts analysis, and
stating that it “would prohibit the use of the class action mechanism in the vast majority of securities fraud actions,” which would be “an anomalous result, particularly in the Third Circuit,
where class actions are considered particularly well-suited to securities fraud cases”); Yamner v.
Boich, No. C-92-20597RPA, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20849, at *6–*7, *19–*21 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
15, 1994) (rejecting Seagate’s approach to conflicts and at the same time stressing the importance of liberally construing the certification requirements to enable federal securities actions).
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Mass tort litigation is another area in which beliefs about the
costs and benefits of class litigation affect judicial willingness to probe
the merits. But in these cases the effect goes the other way. Concerned about the extreme settlement pressure of mass tort class actions, a few courts have denied certification on merits-related
grounds. One of the most notable examples is In re Rhone-Poulenc
90
Rorer, Inc., a suit brought by AIDS-infected hemophiliacs against
91
companies supplying allegedly tainted blood products. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s certification of a
class in part because defendants had won most of the individual suits
previously litigated.92 In the court’s view, certifying a class in a case
that appeared so weak on the merits gave too much power to the
93
plaintiffs. It was better for individual cases to proceed separately so
the merits could be tested with a larger sample of verdicts.94
In sum, the Eisen rule is no longer, if it ever was, an absolute ob95
stacle to a preliminary review of the merits. Yet it still stands in the
90. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
91. Id. at 1294.
92. Id. at 1299–1300.
93. Id. (noting that a class action created a liability risk that threatened to cripple the blood
products industry); see also Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749–50 (5th Cir. 1996)
(denying certification on the ground that more experience with individual suits was necessary
for the court to do an informed predominance and superiority analysis under Rule 23(b)(3), because individual suits will help the court, among other things, determine the importance of
common questions for trial and identify the most salient claims and issues). But see In re Copley
Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995) (criticizing Rhone-Poulenc for refusing to certify a class, and noting that Rhone-Poulenc’s merits-based analysis violates the Eisen rule).
94. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299–1300 (noting “the pattern that results will reflect a
consensus, or at least a pooling of judgment, of many different tribunals”); see also In re VISA
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480, at *58–*72 (2d
Cir. Oct. 17, 2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district judge’s conditional certification was erroneous, and stressing the enormous settlement pressure that certification gives
plaintiffs and the high likelihood that a certified class action never would be tried on the merits);
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2001) (stressing both the
settlement pressure imposed on the defendant by a “bet-your-company” class action and the
need for a preliminary merits inquiry to make the Rule 23(b)(3) certification determinations).
95. There are two other, rather special, situations in which courts conduct a merits review
at the certification stage. One involves certification of a “limited fund” class action under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) authorizes a class action when the assets of the defendant are too
limited to satisfy all the expected damage awards. Under these circumstances, case-by-case litigation can leave some injured parties without any meaningful recovery. A class action helps ensure that the limited fund is distributed fairly among all class members. To determine whether a
defendant’s assets in fact constitute a limited fund, however, the court must estimate the likelihood of success on the merits and the probable recovery in the average case. Accordingly, a
merits review is normally part of the certification process. See, e.g., In re Sch. Asbestos Litig.,
789 F.2d 996, 1005 (3d Cir. 1986) (vacating the certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) nationwide
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way of the kind of serious merits inquiry that class certification requires. Moreover, it has spawned an incoherent body of certification
decisions. When a court believes it is important to probe the merits, it
will make an effort to distinguish Eisen, if possible. On the other
hand, when, as is all too common, a court wishes to avoid a careful
certification analysis—because, for example, the evidence is complex
or the benefits of class treatment are perceived to be substantial—it
need only cite Eisen to support its result. This kind of ad hoc—indeed
post hoc—process of justification is especially problematic in the class
action setting where certification has a potentially serious impact on
settlement dynamics. For this reason, it is important to reexamine the
Eisen rule and its underlying rationale. To this task we now turn.
III. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EISEN RULE
96

Several commentators have criticized the Eisen rule, and the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has on occasion considered,
97
though never approved, proposals to eliminate it. Yet Eisen’s de-

mandatory class for punitive damages because “neither the record nor the court’s findings are
adequate to support the procedure,” while recognizing the “inherent limitations of any factual
inquiry undertaken at such an early stage of the litigation”).
The second situation involves the settlement class action. In a settlement class action,
plaintiffs and defendants agree to a settlement before filing suit. They file a class action to obtain court approval under Rule 23(e) so that the settlement will bind all class members. Because
settlement and certification are inextricably intertwined in these cases, the judge normally reviews the terms of the settlement at the same time as she certifies the class. And reviewing the
settlement normally involves some kind of evaluation of the class plaintiffs’ likelihood of success
on the merits. As a result, the structure of the settlement class action happens to locate the
merits review at the same stage as the certification decision. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp.
Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 805 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing “the
special difficulties the court encounters with its duties under Rule 23(e) in approving settlements where negotiations occur before the court has certified the class”).
96. See Berry, supra note 4, at 312–14 (“A preliminary hearing on the merits prior to entry
of a certification order is potentially the most effective technique for managing massive class
actions, but this device was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin . . . .”); McGuire, supra note 4, at 370–81 (arguing that in claims for monetary relief,
courts should be free to conduct a preliminary assessment of the merits in deciding whether to
certify a class); Priest, supra note 4, at 570–73 (stressing that, although “[i]n an ideal world, Rule
23 might be amended to overrule Eisen,” Eisen can be read to allow “some substantial range” of
precertification merits review); Weinstein & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 369–70 & n.3 (cautioning
against an “unnecessary extension” of the dictum in Eisen that would unnecessarily “prevent
consideration of the merits for other purposes before certification”).
97. See, e.g., WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 101–10 app. B (reproducing a November
1995 draft of a proposed revision of Rule 23 considered by the Advisory Committee, which in
subdivision (b)(3)(E) authorizes an inquiry into the merits); see also Berry, supra note 4, at 314
n.91 (listing authorities favoring a preliminary merits review as of 1980). See generally HENSLER
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fenders cite a number of reasons to support the rule. The Eisen Court
itself relied on the language of Rule 23(c)(1) and on the importance
of avoiding prejudice from an early merits decision.98 Some defenders
also stress the value of keeping the certification decision as a purely
procedural inquiry free of entanglement with substance.99 Still others
point to the risk of erroneous certification denials and the high cost of
100
undertaking a complicated factual inquiry at an early stage.
The following analysis first describes in somewhat more detail
our proposed alternative to the Eisen rule, and then considers in turn
each of the reasons offered in support of Eisen, evaluating them in
light of the advantages of the alternative approach.
A. The Alternative: Reviewing the Merits at Certification
The Eisen rule cannot possibly preclude consideration of the
purely legal elements of the plaintiffs’ substantive claim or the facts as
they are alleged in the complaint, for otherwise there would be no
way to identify common questions, assess typicality, or evaluate the
other certification requirements. The controversy centers on whether
courts should be allowed to probe behind the factual allegations, examine the evidence, and consider the strength of class issues and
101
102
claims. The Eisen rule, strictly construed, bars this approach. Our
proposal requires it.

ET AL.,

supra note 34, at 28–37 (reviewing the history of proposals to revise Rule 23, including
the addition of a merits review to the certification inquiry).
98. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“Additionally, we might
note that a preliminary determination of the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since of necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to civil trials.”).
99. See, e.g., McCray v. Standard Oil Co., 76 F.R.D. 490, 495 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (noting that
courts should resolve certification issues before deciding a motion directed to the merits “to
preserve the purely procedural character” of the certification decision).
100. For the process-cost argument, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and
Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 689
(1979) (“It would be extremely naïve to believe that lawyers would not transform the enormous
energy now devoted to the certification question under rule 23(c)(1) to [the precertification
merit review] context . . . .”).
101. Compare Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maint. Corp., 574 F.2d 656, 661 n.15 (2d Cir.
1978) (noting that it is proper to accept allegations of the complaint as true when deciding class
certification), with Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the view espoused in Shelter Realty, and holding that judges may probe allegations and evidence
relating to the merits when necessary to evaluate Rule 23’s certification requirements).
102. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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In the modest form of our proposal, the trial judge would review
the evidence and determine whether the legal and factual issues on
which the parties rely to support (or oppose) commonality, typicality,
predominance, and other Rule 23 certification requirements are in
fact viable. If an issue is not viable, it would be ignored in the certification analysis. In addition, the judge would consider evidence, not
just allegations, when mapping the path of the lawsuit and predicting
which issues—those common to the class or specific to individual class
members—are likely to consume the bulk of litigation time and resources. Finally, the judge in our proposal would weigh the evidence
on both sides—not only evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ prima facie case, but also the defendant’s rebuttal evidence and, when relevant, any evidence relating to affirmative defenses.
Under our more ambitious proposal, the judge would conduct
the same evidentiary review, but that review would not be limited to
Rule 23’s certification requirements. Instead, the judge would make a
general assessment of the strength of the plaintiffs’ case as a whole
and certify a class only if the case met a threshold “likelihood of success” standard.
Neither our modest nor our ambitious proposal requires a minitrial on the merits or full-blown factual and expert discovery. Rather,
the trial judge must give the merits issues some attention and evaluate
whether they are viable under a standard that would give the plaintiffs some benefit of the doubt, but not a free pass. Again, the objective is to weed out frivolous claims and unfounded class action allegations so they do not form an improper basis for class certification. We
discuss the standard in more detail below.
This focus on evidence means that the parties must have access
to precertification discovery, although that discovery should be
strictly limited in duration and scope to contain costs at the certifica103
tion stage and control strategic abuse. The idea is to provide an op103. Courts that have inquired into the merits usually do so after some opportunity for discovery. See, e.g., Szabo, 249 F.3d at 676 (opining that “[b]efore deciding whether to allow a case
to proceed as a class action . . . a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are
necessary under Rule 23,” including receiving evidence and holding hearings). Furthermore,
some courts currently use a similar approach in analogous areas, allowing only limited preliminary discovery in connection with early determinations of qualified immunity in § 1983 cases.
See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 819–21 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the rule barring discovery in regard to illicit motivation does not bar limited discovery concerning a defendant official’s state of mind for other purposes); Karen M. Blum, Heightened Pleading: Is There
Life After Leatherman?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 92–95 (1994) (arguing for limited discovery in
qualified immunity cases where a defendant’s state of mind is crucial to the underlying substan-
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portunity for the parties to conduct core discovery—one or two
rounds of document requests and a few depositions limited to key
witnesses probably would be sufficient in most cases. Of course, if
plaintiffs base class certification on complicated theories that need to
be supported with detailed factual evidence, then more discovery
might be warranted. To be sure, early merits determinations, even
those limited to a threshold likelihood of success standard, can be less
accurate than determinations made after full discovery and on a complete evidentiary record. However, the increased error risk must be
balanced against the errors that are generated currently by certifications that ignore the merits altogether—a point we develop in more
depth in Section D.
It is also important that the judge make all merits evaluations
explicitly and justify each of them by reference to the evidence. For
example, if plaintiffs allege that a defendant’s discriminatory practices
have a single company-wide source, the trial judge would have to
weigh the evidence on both sides of the issue and make an explicit determination whether the allegation is sufficiently viable to support a
finding of commonality and typicality and to warrant certification under either the modest or ambitious proposal.
Nevertheless, all we would require is that the issue or the case as
a whole meet a threshold level of likelihood of success. It is not necessary that the merits be strong or important enough that the benefits of
class treatment exceed the costs in the specific case.104 Our proposed
likelihood of success standard would be similar to the one judges now
use for evaluating preliminary injunction motions, but perhaps not
quite as stringent.105 This choice of standard has a number of advantive claim and the facts pertaining to that state of mind are “peculiarly within the control of the
defendant”). Also, courts routinely decide preliminary injunction motions on a limited evidentiary record—even though preliminary injunction determinations are almost always followed by
settlement and even though the judge’s decision shapes relative bargaining power and thus the
outcome of the case.
104. Cf. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 473–76 (discussing problems with a case-specific,
cost-benefit certification standard, including the possibility of judicial bias based upon the
judge’s personal attitude and social beliefs). Admittedly, any element added to the certification
analysis, especially one that gives judges greater power to deny certification, is likely to evoke
controversy both at the stage of adoption and at the stage of application. This is, however, a
poor reason, standing alone, to reject an otherwise sensible reform.
105. See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.22 (3d ed.
1997) (stating that, in seeking a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show likelihood
of success on the merits). This is not the only possible choice, of course. Other options include a
simple “nonfrivolous” test or something closer to a summary judgment test. See McGuire, supra
note 4, at 397 (recommending a “substantial possibility of success” standard); Miller, supra note
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tages. Judges are accustomed to applying it in the preliminary injunction setting. Moreover, the standard is designed in part to balance the
error costs from granting and denying preliminary injunctive relief,
just as our proposed merits review is designed to balance error costs
from granting and denying certification.106 In addition, the likelihood
of success test performs a similar gatekeeping function as our proposed merits review does for certification. In both situations, trial
judges can use the test to avoid conferring settlement leverage on
plaintiffs in weak cases.107 Finally, the likelihood of success standard
has the virtue of flexibility; it allows the judge in appropriate cases to
adjust the threshold to differences in false grant and false denial error
costs.108
B. The Eisen Court’s Rationale: Rule 23’s Language and Risk of
Prejudice
As we saw above,109 the Eisen Court read the language of subdivision (c)(1) of Rule 23 to require a prompt certification decision that
ruled out a time-consuming inquiry into the merits. In fact, however,
23(c)(1) requires no such thing. The Rule does not provide a precise
timetable for certification; it simply instructs the trial judge to make
the certification decision “[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of [the] action.” What is “practicable” within the meaning
of 23(c)(1) depends on what the certification requirements of Rule
110
23(a) and (b) demand.
General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon111 recognized
this point. The Falcon Court held that Rule 23 demanded a rigorous
100, at 689 & nn.109–10 (criticizing the use of a proposed “serious question” test). Whatever the
standard, however, the trial judge’s task is the same: she must evaluate the evidence with regard
to each issue and determine whether the evidence meets the standard.
106. See infra Part III.D.
107. A favorable decision on a preliminary injunction motion, like a favorable certification
decision, creates considerable settlement leverage and frequently leads to a settlement. See Jean
O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 573, 601 (2001) (asserting that the plaintiff’s option to seek preliminary injunctive relief
provides “a particularly effective threat to use against capital-constrained defendants”).
108. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY K. KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948.3, at 195 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the sliding scale for deciding preliminary injunction motions).
109. See supra Part I.C.
110. See 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1785, at 96 (noting that “[t]he time
at which the court finds it ‘practicable’ to make a class action determination may vary with the
circumstances of the particular case”).
111. 457 U.S. 147 (1982). For a discussion of Falcon, see supra Part II.A.
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certification analysis.112 Insofar as a rigorous analysis requires an inquiry into the merits, the certification decision must await that inquiry. Under those circumstances, it is not “practicable” to make the
decision more quickly.
Understood in this way, 23(c)(1) does not impose an independent constraint on the timing of certification or the scope of a meritsrelated inquiry. Its purpose is simply to assure that the judge attends
to the certification decision promptly rather than postponing it until
later in the suit. Indeed, as part of the certification process today,
courts allow limited discovery and indulge rather extensive and time113
consuming argument—all without running afoul of 23(c)(1).
The Eisen Court also noted the possible prejudice that might result from a preliminary determination of the merits in the absence of
114
the usual trial safeguards. In particular, the Court worried that “tentative findings” might “color the subsequent proceedings” and “place
an unfair burden on the defendant.”115 In Eisen, it was the plaintiff
who sought the preliminary determination and the defendant who
faced possible prejudice.116 These roles are reversed in most class action cases, in which the defendant questions the merits and the plaintiff stands to suffer prejudice by a premature review. Yet the Eisen
Court’s argument can apply to both situations: if certification is denied, the plaintiff’s individual case might be affected adversely by a
preliminary merits review; if certification is granted, the defendant
might be prejudiced in opposing the class.
Regardless of which party is affected, the argument based on
prejudice is seriously flawed. Whatever prejudice might result is not
112. 457 U.S. at 161.
113. See 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1785, at 107–10 (noting that some
courts may allow precertification discovery if “useful” or “necessary”). See generally WILLGING
ET AL., supra note 31, at 8–9, 36–39 (reporting that “[j]udges ruled on motions to certify within
median times of 2.8 months to 8.5 months after the date of the motion” and describing the range
of disputed issues in contests over class certification).
114. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974). The Court also seemed troubled
by the prospect of a class representative obtaining the benefits of a merits determination without first satisfying the requirements for certification. Id. at 177–78. This is a puzzling concern.
After all, a class representative benefits only if the class is certified; otherwise, a tentative and
provisional determination is not particularly helpful to him in adjudicating his individual case.
Moreover, insofar as Rule 23’s certification requirements call for an inquiry into the merits, such
an inquiry cannot give plaintiffs more of a benefit than they are entitled to receive under Rule
23. But see Priest, supra note 4, at 572–73 (interpreting this language creatively as a way to distinguish Eisen and permit a precertification merits review to screen unmeritorious suits).
115. 417 U.S. at 178.
116. Id. at 177–78.
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sufficient to justify Eisen’s blanket prohibition. Similar risks attend
the grant of a preliminary injunction, which also requires a preliminary evaluation of the merits.117 To be sure, the preliminary injunction
118
is a well-established equitable remedy, but so too is the class action.
Moreover, the argument from prejudice overlooks the fact that a
judge is always formulating tentative opinions about the merits as a
case progresses and relying on those informal opinions to manage the
suit.119 Admittedly, it might be somewhat harder for a judge to keep
an open mind when the determination is formal, even if it is also supposed to be tentative and provisional. That result is not necessarily
objectionable, though, since a formal, systematic, and public determination is likely to be more accurate than an informal one and thus
more worthy of reliance.
Although the Eisen Court did not mention it, one also must consider the effect of an early merits determination on settlement incentives. We consider this factor as part of an error-cost analysis in Section D. But first we must deal with a different sort of objection.
C. The Substance/Procedure Dichotomy and the Federal Rules
Scheme
Those who believe that procedure should be limited to strictly
technical matters dealing exclusively with the conduct of litigation
might object that an early merits review involves the court too deeply
120
in the substance of a lawsuit. It is difficult to know how to respond
to this sort of objection because its formalistic quality obscures its underlying logic. Insofar as the argument assumes that it is possible to
mark a sharp divide between procedure and substance, it ignores de-

117. See supra note 105.
118. See generally YEAZELL, supra note 26; Bone, supra note 26, at 257–304 (tracing equitable jurisdiction over representative suits from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the
modern class device).
119. See Weinstein & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 382 (asserting that in managing class actions
a judge is “constantly considering merits-related issues” to “fulfill his or her obligations under
Rule 16”).
120. It is worth mentioning that a certification rule authorizing a merits review would not
“abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right” in violation of the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). For if it did, we would have to worry about Rule 56 (summary judgment) and Rule 11 (sanctions for frivolous suits) as well.
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cades of judicial frustration grappling with the procedure/substance
dichotomy in a variety of procedural settings.121
Nevertheless, it is true that procedural rules seldom rely explicitly on an assessment of the evidentiary merits. Motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim test the legal sufficiency of a case, but they do
so without probing the evidence or questioning the factual allegations. Moreover, pleading rules, party and claim joinder rules, and
discovery rules make no explicit reference to evidentiary factors.
Some procedural rules, however, contemplate a merits review, at
122
least in some cases. Summary judgment is the most obvious example. Ever since the Supreme Court expanded the use of summary
judgment in 1986,123 lower courts have examined the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s evidence with some care to screen frivolous and weak cases.
Furthermore, courts evaluate the merits, at least in a preliminary way,
when substantive issues are relevant to threshold questions like personal jurisdiction.124 Given these examples, it would be a mistake to
believe that the current system completely insulates its procedural
rules from a substantive review. When such a review makes sense as a
policy matter, the rules allow it.

121. The most famous example, of course, is the line of cases applying the Erie doctrine. See
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (holding that in diversity cases, federal
courts should follow the substantive law of the state in which they sit).
122. And judges implicitly consider the merits of the various issues when they decide how to
manage the litigation. See Weinstein & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 382 (“The fact that formal
merits pronouncements are rare . . . in . . . the pretrial process . . . does not mean that the judge
never considers the merits . . . . The dynamics of litigation require a continually changing hypothesis about the merits.”).
123. Three cases decided by the Supreme Court in its 1986 term—the so-called Celotex trilogy—expanded the use of summary judgment as a screening device. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (holding that a moving party may obtain summary judgment by
showing an absence of evidence in support of the nonmovant’s case); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that the trial burden of persuasion should be incorporated into the standard for determining whether to grant summary judgment); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (holding that the nonmoving
party must do “more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts”).
124. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
preliminary inquiries into the merits are routinely made in connection with subject matter and
personal jurisdiction motions under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)). In addition, Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)
authorizes a judge to refuse additional discovery if he determines that “the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(iii). When
making such a determination, the judge must evaluate, if only implicitly, the sufficiency of current evidence in light of the evidence sought in order to determine the value of additional discovery.
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Still, the procedural system seems to favor postponing a serious
evidentiary review until after substantial discovery has been completed. Summary judgment, for example, usually takes place only after the parties have had ample opportunity to uncover information
125
and evidence. Indeed, the original drafters of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure implemented a preference for deciding cases on the
facts and evidence rather than on technicalities, and as a result they
relaxed pleading requirements and broadened discovery.126
One might argue from this preference that an early merits review
conflicts with the basic scheme of the Federal Rules because it bars
class litigation before the parties have had a chance to develop the
evidence fully. The trouble with an early merits review, according to
this objection, is not that it is unreliable or too costly—we address
those arguments in Sections D and E—but instead that it is incompatible with the intent of those who drafted the class action rule and
inconsistent with the basic structure of the Federal Rules scheme.127
This objection fails for a number of reasons. For one thing, denial of certification is simply not the same as a final dismissal. It does
not prevent the plaintiffs from conducting discovery and trying their
claims; they remain free to continue with individual suits, conduct dis128
covery, and investigate the facts. It is true that a denial of certifica125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f) (stating that a court may refuse or continue a summary judgment motion to permit affidavits or depositions to be taken or other methods of discovery to be
had).
126. This was a constant theme of Charles Clark, the reporter to the original advisory committee and the main architect of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Charles Clark, The Handmaid of
Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 308–20 (1938) (discussing the advantages of notice pleading and
the importance of deciding cases on the merits).
127. Cf. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (striking down a Fifth Circuit rule requiring strict pleading in civil rights
cases—which had been designed to screen frivolous suits—on the basis that the rule conflicted
with the Federal Rules’ notice pleading scheme).
128. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the original drafters of the Federal Rules would have
been terribly concerned in 1938 about creating obstacles to class suits. Historically, the class action fits only awkwardly into a world dominated by individual litigation, see YEAZELL, supra
note 26, at 220 (discussing how early Justices recognizing group litigation grappled with “such
intangibles as American strains of individualism”), and the original Rule 23 narrowly confined
the device to traditional rights-based categories, see Bone, supra note 26, at 286 (stating that
rather than litigating on behalf of class members, a representative party was an advocate of a
rights-based interest in which all class members shared). The 1966 Rule drafters expanded the
class action, but they also imposed restrictive certification requirements. See HENSLER ET AL.,
supra note 34, at 12–15 (explaining that, while “maintain[ing] the tripartite structure of the 1938
Rule, the committee rewrote the requirements for each type of class action”). When a rigorous
application of those requirements calls for an inquiry into the evidentiary merits, doing so cannot be inconsistent with the drafters’ intent.
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tion, as a practical matter, can quell all hope of further litigation when
class members have claims too small to justify individual suits. However, it is not the denial of certification that prevents plaintiffs from
suing; it is the fact that litigation is costly. This does not mean that
one should be unconcerned about the effect of an early merits review
on the availability of small-claim class actions. Rather, it means that
any such concern must be addressed as a straightforward policy matter, not as a matter of the drafters’ intent or the system’s structure.
Furthermore, the rule drafters in 1938 could not have meant to
adopt an absolute principle requiring that cases always be decided on
the evidence. Evidence is costly to acquire and produce, so it is simply
not practical to base every decision on a complete evidentiary record.
As we demonstrate in Section D, a preliminary merits review at the
certification stage strikes an appropriate balance between the need
for evidence and the cost of obtaining it. In our proposal, the parties
are allowed to conduct limited precertification discovery and to argue
about the adequacy of one another’s evidentiary presentations. Although precertification discovery must be strictly limited, even limited discovery has a good chance of revealing salient evidence. And
the reason for not allowing more extensive discovery is perfectly consistent with the factors that justify limitations more generally—in this
case, expansive discovery would be too costly at the certification
stage.
Even if a ban on early merits review were consistent with the rule
drafters’ intent, the realities of contemporary litigation militate
against such a ban. The original commitment to deciding cases on the
evidence assumes that most cases will be resolved by formal adjudication. The fact is, however, that most class action suits settle,129 and set129. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) (observing that the
use of the settlement-only class has become a “stock device”); Bryan G. Garth, Civil Litigation
Through the Class Action, 62 IND. L.J. 497, 501–04 (1987) (noting that most class actions settle
prior to trial, that certification is the crucial stage for settlement, and that a decision not to certify “reduces the bargaining power of the plaintiff and the will to continue the fight”); Thomas
E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Changes, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 142–44 (1996) (presenting evidence that suggests that many class action settlements occur shortly after or at the time of certification); see also Priest, supra note 4, at 522
(observing that “virtually every mass tort action that has been successfully certified has settled
out of court rather than been litigated to judgment”). To be sure, the settlement rate is very
high for litigation in general—by most estimates, approximately seventy percent of all cases
filed in federal court end in pretrial settlement. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 15, at 926 nn.10–11
(reporting on the empirical studies). Although hard to substantiate empirically, see HENSLER ET
AL., supra note 34, at 126 n.52 (discussing the absence of comprehensive data on class actions in
both state and federal courts), there is reason to believe that certified class actions settle at a
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tlement encourages strategic behavior that can produce high social
costs. These strategic costs are a principal source of concern, and as
we shall see in the following Section, the main reason for requiring a
preliminary merits review at the certification stage.130
D. The Error-Cost Argument
Some courts invoking the Eisen rule emphasize the provisional
131
nature of the certification decision. The idea is that the judge can
always correct an erroneous certification later when she has access to
the fruits of discovery and greater experience with the litigation.
Some courts go even further and note the importance of a generous
approach to certification for securing the policy benefits of the class
action, especially in those cases where the claims are too small to be
brought individually.132
These points make most sense as components of an argument
133
based on expected error costs. The goal of an error-cost analysis is
higher rate, see WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 60, 179 tbl. 40 (noting that the settlement
rates for cases brought as class actions within four federal districts were two to five times higher
if a class was certified than if it was not); Garth, supra, at 501 (finding a 78% settlement rate for
certified class actions compared to a 15% settlement rate for noncertified cases in a sample of
119 class action cases from the Northern District of California).
130. Adapting principles to changing conditions is perfectly consistent with an argument
from drafters’ intent. The original rule drafters understood that litigation conditions would
change over time, and they made the Federal Rules flexible enough to adjust. See Robert G.
Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the
Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 99–100 (1989) (citing the drafters’ preference for flexibility and discretion over procedural formalism). Given the strong link between
rules and underlying principles, it is reasonable to suppose that the drafters intended flexibility
to operate at the level of principle as well.
131. According to Rule 23(c)(1), a certification order “may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1). This factor is cited frequently. See Esplin
v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968) (“But if there is to be an error made, let it be in favor
and not against the maintenance of the class action, for it is always subject to modification
should later developments during the course of the trial so require.”); Barnes v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 492–93 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“Thus, even though this case may present a close
question as to whether this action should be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), the Court will grant
certification because the Court may amend the certification order before a decision on the merits . . . .”); 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1785, at 128–30 (observing that the
power to decertify later has encouraged many courts to grant certification very liberally).
132. See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
903 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule 23 factors should be construed liberally “[i]n
light of the importance of the class action device in securities fraud suits”); In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. 403, 419 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that doubts should be resolved in favor
of certification given the important role of private enforcement of the antitrust laws).
133. See, e.g., Council of & for the Blind of Del. County Valley, Inc. v. Regan, 709 F.2d
1521, 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Robinson, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
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to minimize the expected cost of judicial error. In a perfect world,
judges would make all certification decisions correctly. Certification
would be granted whenever the case satisfied Rule 23’s requirements
and denied when it did not. There would be no need for the Eisen
rule or any other limitation on what a judge could consider. Indeed,
the judge would have to be free to examine all the relevant evidence
to ensure an accurate result.
We do not live in a perfect world, however. Judges make mistakes. They grant certification when it should be denied, and they
deny certification when it should be granted. Each of these mistakes
generates its own costs. An erroneous grant creates unnecessary administrative and litigation costs and can pressure defendants to pay
for unjustified settlements. An erroneous denial adds to plaintiffs’
litigation costs and can make it harder for plaintiffs to recover.
The objective, from an error-cost perspective, is to choose the
procedural rule (or rules) that minimizes the total cost of error. Suppose, for example, that the choice is between two certification rules,
Rule A and Rule B, and suppose that judges make fewer erroneous
grants and fewer erroneous denials when they use Rule A. In this
situation, Rule A is obviously superior to Rule B since it improves judicial accuracy across the board.
Policy choices are seldom so easy, however. Usually there is no
single rule that reduces both types of error—erroneous grants as well
as erroneous denials. Normally, rules reduce one type of error but increase the other. Consider a familiar example outside the class action
setting: the choice between a preponderance-of-the-evidence rule and
a reasonable-doubt rule for the burden of persuasion at trial. Neither
rule is an easy choice based on the error rate alone. Relative to the
preponderance rule, the reasonable-doubt rule reduces the number of
erroneous convictions—but it also increases the number of erroneous
acquittals. Which rule one chooses depends on how one assesses the
harm of erroneous convictions relative to the harm of erroneous acquittals.
In these hard cases, therefore, the choice must turn not just on
the error rate, but also on the relative importance—or costs—of the
two kinds of error. The reason we choose the reasonable-doubt rule
Better it is, in any sort of case, to utilize class certification liberally when suitdismissals would chance the loss of a meritorious claim forever. Should the soundness
of the determination on class-action status be later drawn into question . . . Rule 23 itself suggests a ready means for the handling the problem [through amendment or alteration of certification later].
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in criminal cases, for example, is because we believe that the cost of
an erroneous conviction—the potential deprivation of liberty—is
much greater than the cost of an erroneous acquittal. As the aphorism
goes, it is better to acquit ten guilty persons than to convict an innocent one.134
Returning to our class certification problem, the choice of rule,
when no rule is a clear winner, must depend on how the cost of erroneous grants compares to the cost of erroneous denials. From this
perspective, the crucial feature of the Eisen rule is that it reduces erroneous denials but increases erroneous grants. With this framework,
we can see why courts emphasize the two factors they do: the provisional nature of certification and the social policies served by the class
action. The first factor downplays the significance of erroneous
grants—if initial certification is provisional, then an erroneous grant
can be corrected later on—while the second factor plays up the importance of erroneous denials—if the class action serves important
social policies, an erroneous denial is likely to be quite costly.
The argument in this simple form is superficially appealing, but it
does not survive close analysis. As we shall see, initial certification is
much more likely to be permanent than provisional. Moreover, erroneous denials are not nearly as costly or as likely as the argument assumes. Combining these factors with the potentially high cost of erroneous grants, it is clear that the error-cost analysis, far from
supporting the Eisen rule, actually undermines it.
1. The Overall Structure of the Argument: Three Propositions.
135
Let us systematize these points in a somewhat more rigorous way.
136
The expected cost of an error is just the social cost of the error discounted by the probability that the error will in fact materialize. As
we saw, two different types of error must be considered: false grants

134. In most civil cases, on the other hand, we choose the preponderance rule because we
believe that the costs of the two kinds of error are roughly equivalent.
135. Error-cost analysis is a branch of decision theory and has been developed extensively in
that literature. See generally R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS:
INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY (1957) (providing a comprehensive analysis of game
theory and related decisionmaking models). It also has been applied frequently to legal problems in a number of different areas. See, e.g., C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41, 61–75 (1999) (applying a basic decisionmaking theoretic framework to antitrust litigation).
136. By “social cost,” we mean no more than the total harm caused by the error. This harm
can be moral as well as economic in character. See infra note 233.
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of certification and false denials.137 In the certification context, a false
grant is a grant of certification in a case that in fact does not qualify
for certification under Rule 23, either because it is substantively
frivolous or because while meritorious it does not in fact meet the
Rule’s requirements. A false denial is a denial of certification in a
case that is substantively meritorious and in fact qualifies for certification under Rule 23.138
To illustrate how this analysis applies to the Eisen rule, consider
a hypothetical choice between two rules: Rule E and Rule N. Rule E
(“E” for Eisen) is the strict form of the Eisen rule: it forbids any inquiry into the evidence and the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the
merits at the certification stage. Suppose as well that Rule E includes,
as it does in many cases, a presumption favoring initial certification.
Rule N (“N” for Not-Eisen) is our modest proposal. It requires an
explicit inquiry into the evidence and a determination of whether the
plaintiff has a significant likelihood of success on a merits-related is139
sue whenever the issue is relevant to Rule 23’s certification analysis.
In this hypothetical, the error-cost argument for choosing Rule E
over Rule N can be systematized in the following three propositions:
(1) Rule E reduces the number of false denials of certification
but increases the number of false grants compared to Rule N.

137. In the decision-theoretic literature, these two types of error are known as “false positives” (or Type I error) and “false negatives” (or Type II error). See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I
Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711
(1996) (defining and using these terms). See generally ALVIN W. DRAKE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
APPLIED PROBABILITY THEORY 240–41 (1967) (discussing Type I and Type II errors).
138. More precisely, an error-cost analysis considers four variables: (1) the probability of a
false grant (i.e., an erroneous grant of certification); (2) the cost of a false grant; (3) the probability of a false denial (i.e., an erroneous denial of certification); and (4) the cost of a false denial. The expected cost of a false grant or a false denial is simply its probability multiplied by its
cost. And the goal of the error-cost analysis is to minimize the sum of the expected costs of the
two types of error: that is, to minimize the expected cost of false grants plus the expected cost of
false denials.
139. See supra notes 101–08 and accompanying text. Although we recommend a likelihood
of success standard, Rule N could incorporate a different standard for determining the minimum merits threshold, such as nonfrivolousness or the summary judgment test. See supra note
105. Whatever the standard, however, Rule N requires an explicit determination of whether
plaintiffs’ evidence on the issue meets the standard. For example, suppose the defendant argues
that Rule 23’s commonality or predominance requirements are not satisfied because the allegedly common question is too weak or frivolous. Under any version of Rule N, the trial judge
must examine all the relevant evidence available at the certification stage and make an explicit
determination as to whether the plaintiff meets the threshold standard with respect to the common question. If the plaintiff does not meet the standard, the judge must ignore the common
question when determining commonality and predominance.
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(2) A false denial is likely to be more costly than a false grant:
(2a) False grants can be corrected, whereas false denials are
more likely to be permanent.
(2b) The cost of a false denial is the potentially high cost of
frustrating the important social policies of the class action,
whereas the cost of a false grant is, by virtue of (2a), mainly
just the cost of managing a class action for the period between initial certification and later reconsideration, dismissal,
or summary judgment.
(3) Therefore, Rule E is superior to Rule N. In short, Rule E
minimizes expected error costs by reducing the number of
false certification denials (see [1] above) where false denials
are the more costly kind of error (see [2] above).
By structuring the argument in this way, we can see exactly
where its weaknesses lie. The first thing to note is that Proposition 1 is
clearly valid. The Eisen rule’s cursory analysis and liberal attitude toward certification produces a high rate of certification. Thus, Rule E
obviously reduces the risk of false certification denials and increases
140
the risk of false grants.
However, both Propositions 2 and 3 are seriously flawed. In
brief, there are two major problems. First, and most important,
Proposition 2 ignores the fact that most class actions settle, often soon
141
after certification. By eliminating the reconsideration option, early
settlement undermines the validity of Proposition 2a. Also, settlement
changes the cost of false certification grants with consequences for the
validity of Proposition 2b.
The second serious problem is in Proposition 3. The conclusion
that Rule E is superior depends not on whether Rule E creates fewer
false certification denials than Rule N, as Proposition 3 assumes, but
on how many fewer false denials it creates and how this compares to
the number of false grants it adds. In particular, whether Rule E is

140. To be sure, Rule E also makes it easier for defendants to introduce frivolous or weak
affirmative defenses to scuttle a finding of commonality, predominance, or superiority. See
Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 342 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that
class certification may be inappropriate where affirmative defenses turn on facts peculiar to
each plaintiff’s case). Yet given the limited range of defenses and the presumption in favor of
certification, it seems reasonable to assume that plaintiffs will succeed in obtaining certification
erroneously far more often than defendants will succeed in opposing it.
141. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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better than Rule N depends on whether the benefit of Rule E is
worth the price—or more precisely on how the reduction in false certification denials (the benefit) compares to the increase in false certification grants (the price). Even if the cost of a false denial exceeds
the cost of a false grant, the price for Rule E still can be too high.142
The following discussion examines these points more closely.
2. The Flaws in Proposition 2.
a. Class certification and settlement. Proposition 2b assumes
that the cost of managing the class action between initial certification
and later reconsideration is relatively low. This assumption underes143
timates the complexity of class action litigation. Management of a
large class action requires coordination of multiple attorneys, close
supervision of discovery, and extensive involvement by the judge in
many aspects of the litigation process. The higher the judicial management and litigation costs during the period between certification
and reconsideration, the greater the expected costs that a false grant
of certification creates.
Much more important, however, is the fact that Proposition 2 ignores the impact of settlement. This is a very serious omission because the vast majority of certified class actions settle, most soon after
144
certification. A 1995 study of terminated class actions in four federal
districts, conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, found that “the
percentage of certified class actions terminated by a class settlement
145
ranged from 62% to 100%” depending on the federal district court.

142. To see this point mathematically, let rE be the probability of a false grant of certification
when Rule E is in effect, and let rN be the same probability when Rule N is in effect. Let sE be
the probability of a false denial when Rule E is in effect, and let sN be the same probability when
Rule N is in effect. Let cG be the cost of a false grant and cD the cost of a false denial. Then Rule
E is superior to Rule N only if: rEcG + sEcD < rNcG + sNcD. Rewriting this inequality, we get:
[rE – rN]/[sN – sE] < cD/cG

(1)

That is, the ratio of the difference in the probability of false grants to the difference in the probability of false denials must be less than the ratio of false denial cost to false grant cost. Therefore, if rE – rN is much greater than sN – sE, then (1) might not hold—even if cD is greater than cG.
For an example and additional analysis, see infra note 230.
143. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 475 (remarking on the high transaction
costs associated with class action litigation).
144. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
145. The actual distribution of figures is 62% in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 66% in
the Northern District of Illinois, 88% in the Northern District of California, and 100% in the
Southern District of Florida. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 179 tbl. 40; see also Garth, su-
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Only about 9% of all the certified class actions in the four districts actually went to trial.146
Other empirical studies, although few in number, show similar
147
results, and together they confirm what most class action lawyers
know to be true: almost all class actions settle, and the class obtains
substantial settlement leverage from a favorable certification decision.148 As we discuss below, this settlement leverage creates serious
problems when deployed in frivolous or weak class action suits, and
the Eisen rule exacerbates the problems by granting certification
without a serious inquiry into the merits. Put simply, because plaintiffs file frivolous and weak cases to obtain a settlement, the greater
prospect of settlement with successful certification should encourage
plaintiffs to file more frivolous and weak class action suits.
Let us take a closer look at this relationship between certification
and frivolous litigation. At the outset, it is important to be clear that
there are two ways for a class action to be frivolous or weak. The
most obvious way is for the individual legal claims of class members
to be substantively defective. “Frivolous” in this sense means, roughly
speaking, a suit with no (or very little) objective factual basis for li149
ability on the legal theories actually alleged. Alternatively, the substantive claims of class members might be substantial, even strong, on
the merits while the class itself, at least as plaintiffs seek to define it,
fails to meet Rule 23’s requirements. “Frivolous” in this second sense
pra note 129, at 501 (finding a 78% settlement rate for certified class actions in a sample of 119
class action cases from the Northern District of California).
146. The distribution is 14% in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 6% in the Northern
District of Illinois, 13% in the Northern District of California, and 0% in the Southern District
of Florida. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 140 fig. 56. The study authors emphasize, however, that “inferences about the universe of trials in class actions nation-wide cannot be made
from these aggregated results.” Id. at 66.
147. See, e.g., Garth, supra note 129, at 501–04 (finding that thirty-six of forty-six certified
class actions settled before trial).
148. The Federal Judicial Center study almost certainly understates the actual frequency of
class action settlement because of the limitations of the database and reporting protocol. The
database excluded mass tort class actions, one of the most settlement-prone areas of class action
litigation, and the settlement rate statistics excluded class actions filed only for settlement purposes.
149. A frivolous suit is not necessarily the same thing as a suit with too little at stake to justify the costs of litigation (in other words, a suit with negative expected value). See Robert G.
Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 529–33 (1997) (discussing the problems
with defining frivolousness and proposing a two-part definition). We also include in the definition suits with “very little” factual basis for liability to allow for the possibility that a court system might choose to exclude lawsuits that are not strictly frivolous but that are too weak on the
merits to justify the expenditure of litigation resources.
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refers to a class action in which class allegations or the class definition
are not supported by the evidence.
As an example of the second situation, a judge might certify a
(b)(3) class action in a relatively strong securities fraud case by relying on a fraud-on-the-market theory to establish predominance, when
a closer examination of the evidence would reveal that the conditions
for that theory are not satisfied.150 Or the evidence might support certification of some classes but not the broad class that the plaintiffs
seek—as when the judge certifies a company-wide class on flimsy evidence of company-wide discrimination when he should have certified
narrower classes limited to individual departments. In these cases, the
certification decision or the broad class definition is inconsistent with
Rule 23’s limits.
The severity of the frivolous class action problem—especially the
problem of substantively frivolous suits—has been a matter of serious
151
concern and heated debate since the early 1970s. The focus intensified in the 1990s with a rise in the number of mass tort class actions
and renewed Advisory Committee interest in revising Rule 23.152
Moreover, in 1995, Congress adopted the Private Securities Litigation
153
Reform Act in response to mounting evidence of frivolous securities
fraud class actions.154 And in recent years, courts have begun to take
explicit note of the connection between class certification, settlement
155
pressure, and frivolous or weak class action filings.
Notwithstanding this keen interest, there is little hard empirical
156
evidence available to quantify the severity of the problem. The main
reason has to do with the high rate of settlement—settlement con-

150. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
151. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 15–37, 93–99 (discussing the controversy over
rampant class action suits brought in the 1970s and the collusion fears of class actions).
152. See id. at 22–37, 62–68 (tracing the steps of the Advisory Committee in the 1990s in its
attempted revision of Rule 23 following a report from a special judicial committee on asbestos
litigation).
153. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in various provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 77 (Supp.
III 1997)).
154. For the history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, see generally Joel
Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1996).
155. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that
“class certification creates an insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not”); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299–1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the implications of the plaintiffs’ claims lacking legal merit).
156. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 93–94 (noting the lack of hard data and the difficulty of obtaining objective reports from lawyers).
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ceals evidence of frivolousness.157 Even so, the few studies that are
available tend to support a correlation between class action settlement and frivolous litigation, at least in some settings. For example, a
1991 study of a sample of securities fraud class actions showed that
the cases tended to settle for standard amounts that bore no relation
to the underlying merits.158 Moreover, a somewhat more recent study
of securities class actions, conducted on a much larger sample and
analyzed using more sophisticated statistical techniques, found strong
evidence of frivolous suits, leading the author to conclude that “most
159
securities fraud class actions are, in fact, frivolous.” In addition,
there is some empirical evidence suggesting that stockholder class and
derivative litigation might have similar problems.160
Although these studies are limited, their results are consistent
with theoretical work on settlement and frivolous suits. The settlement literature shows why class actions attract frivolous litigation and
why the Eisen rule is a substantial contributing cause. Three features
of class action litigation play a key role: first, the class action magnifies the stakes through aggregation; second, it increases the defen-

157. When a case settles, there is no formal review of the merits. Moreover, because of selection effects, one cannot extrapolate from the results in those few cases that actually are tried.
And researchers have very little access to information about settlement amounts, because settlements normally are kept confidential.
158. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 570–77 (1991) (revealing that the “securities laws have
been transformed . . . into a system of insurance against large stock market losses”). This particular study is quite controversial. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do
the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2079–88 (1995) (criticizing Alexander’s study, but conceding that
there may well be a frivolous suit problem in securities class actions).
159. James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 979 (1996). For a summary of some other statistical studies of securities class actions, see id. at 910 n.32 (noting that the studies identified
and discussed provide “conflicting evidence as to the importance of merit in securities class action settlements”).
160. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 66–75 (1991) (presenting data showing that few shareholder lawsuits go to
trial, that those that do involve trivial violations, and that shareholder litigation has little impact
on corporate behavior). For an earlier study that purported to show a high rate of frivolous settlements in class and derivative litigation brought against corporate officers and directors, see
Thomas M. Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Lawsuits, 60 B.U. L. REV. 542, 548–59 (1980) (charting the results of settlements of
shareholder derivative and class action suits). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9
(Summer 1985) (reviewing the strengths and limitations of the Jones study and other similar
results).
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dant’s risk-bearing, litigation, and reputation costs; and third, it enlists
the trial judge in the settlement process. To see more precisely how
these factors attract frivolous suits, we must examine—if only
briefly—the standard theoretical models of frivolous litigation: the
trial-error model, the asymmetric-cost model, and the asymmetricinformation model.161
The trial-error model explains frivolous filings and settlements in
162
the most straightforward way. When trial error is substantial
enough, even a frivolous suit is worth taking to trial and thus worth
settling.163 In this model, the most salient feature of class litigation is
its effect on the stakes. If the plaintiff brings only an individual suit,
the stakes are usually too small relative to litigation costs to justify
taking a frivolous suit to trial under most plausible assumptions about
trial error.164 The class action, however, combines a large number of
individual suits and magnifies the expected recovery to such an extent
that going to trial can be a rational option. Under these circumstances, an entrepreneurial class attorney will have a strong incentive
to file a frivolous suit if he expects a substantial fee from a large class
recovery.165 And when the attorney can make a credible threat to take

161. For a summary description of the various models, see Bone, supra note 149, at 534–66;
see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 701–20 (1986) (discussing various explanations for frivolous strike suits,
including asymmetric or “differential” cost models).
162. The central puzzle of frivolous litigation is to explain why a defendant ever is willing to
settle a frivolous suit. If the plaintiff is almost certain to lose at trial, the plaintiff should drop the
suit in response to the defendant’s refusal to settle. Hence the puzzle: why doesn’t the defendant
simply refuse to settle and force the plaintiff to withdraw?
163. For an analysis of frivolous suits that assumes trial error makes individual litigation rational, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEG.
STUD. 371, 373–74 (1996).
164. See Bone, supra note 149, at 534–37 (noting that, in frivolous suits, the probability of
trial error is not likely to be substantial).
165. By an entrepreneurial attorney, we mean an attorney who brings a class action for his
own personal gain. Class attorneys often control class actions with little oversight from their clients and are motivated in many situations by self-interest. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 896–917 (1987) (discussing the conflicting interests of plaintiffs’ attorneys and their clients with regard to class certification, opt-out provisions, and individual actions). To illustrate, suppose that, due to trial error, a plaintiff with a frivolous case can expect
to win at trial ten percent of the time. Suppose that the plaintiff expects a trial award of $100,000
if he wins but also expects to spend $30,000 litigating the case all the way through trial. Under
these circumstances, it would not be worthwhile for the plaintiff to sue, because the expected
trial value of his case is negative: 0.1 x 100,000 – 30,000 = -$20,000. Now suppose that there are
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the class action to trial, the defendant must consider settlement very
seriously. Indeed, the other two features of class litigation—high costs
and trial judge involvement in settlement—only add to the pressure
and make it harder for the defendant to resist settlement, as we discuss more fully below.166
The other two models of frivolous litigation—the asymmetriccost model and the asymmetric-information model—apply even when
the error risk and the stakes are not large enough to support a credi167
ble trial threat. The asymmetric-cost model predicts that the defendant will settle a frivolous suit when the plaintiff can leverage a cost
advantage by threatening to impose greater costs on the defendant
168
than the defendant can impose on the plaintiff. The asymmetricinformation models instead turn on the plaintiff’s ability to leverage
an informational asymmetry. In the simplest version, the defendant is
uncertain whether the plaintiff’s suit is frivolous, so a frivolous plaintiff can masquerade as meritorious and sometimes fool the defendant
into offering a substantial settlement.169
10,000 identical cases and suppose that an entrepreneurial attorney considers whether to bring a
class action aggregating all 10,000 cases. Suppose the attorney expects to receive one-quarter of
the recovery if he obtains certification and wins the class action. The attorney then has an expected fee award of twenty-five million dollars—0.1 x 0.25 x 10,000 x 100,000 = $25 million. Under these circumstances, the attorney could make a credible threat to take the case all the way
through trial provided the expected litigation costs are less than $25 million. Even after adjusting for risk aversion, his incentives to litigate are strong.
166. Furthermore, a corporation can experience serious and possibly crippling—even bankrupting—cash flow problems dealing with a large class action judgment. Settlement is often an
attractive alternative under these circumstances because the parties can work out a payment
schedule consistent with the defendant’s cash flow constraints. Therefore, if because of trial error class certification makes it attractive for the class attorney to take the case to trial, the defendant will have to worry about the cash flow risk.
167. These models deal mainly with the simple case of one plaintiff and one defendant, see
Bone, supra note 149, at 534–66 (describing the models), but the basic insights extend to class
litigation as well.
168. The primary articles developing the asymmetric-cost models all assume that the parties
have complete information about the merits; that is, both the plaintiff and the defendant know
that the suit is frivolous. It is important to note, however, that these models do not depend just
on asymmetric costs; they also depend on the relative timing of cost expenditures. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J.
LEG. STUD. 1, 5–10 (1996) (recognizing that the litigation costs in negative-expected-value suits
incur gradually rather than all at once); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 3, 3–10 (1985) (assuming
the defendant must incur a cost to respond to a complaint before the plaintiff need spend anything more).
169. The defendant is willing to offer the settlement because it is better than incurring the
costs of litigation if the case turns out to have merit. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to
Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEG. STUD. 437, 441–48 (1988) (showing how informational
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The class action’s effect on costs and the judge’s involvement in
class settlement combine to enhance the incentives to file frivolous
suits in these two models. Costs that follow on the heels of class certification are often asymmetrically distributed in the way that the
170
asymmetric-cost model requires. Moreover, judicial pressure to settle works in favor of frivolous settlements, especially when the judge
ignores the merits. Since the defendant settles in asymmetricinformation models to avoid the costs of litigating, the higher those
costs and the more aggressive the judge’s involvement, the greater the
pressure on the defendant to settle and the more attractive it is for
the plaintiffs to file frivolous suits.171
Let us examine these factors more closely. As to costs, there are
three types affected by class certification: risk-bearing costs, litigation
costs, and reputation costs. High risk-bearing costs follow from the
all-or-nothing nature of the class action gamble: either the defendant
is liable to everyone in the class (a potentially huge liability) or to no

asymmetries may allow plaintiffs to extract settlement offers); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 25 (1990) (analyzing
the “equilibrium suit and settlement strategies” for frivolous strike suits). In other versions, it is
the plaintiff who is uninformed, often because of a failure to investigate before filing. A plaintiff’s ignorance of the frivolous nature of her suit allows her to make a credible threat to litigate,
which induces the defendant to settle. See Bone, supra note 149, at 600 (describing a pure pooling equilibrium, where defendants are willing to settle all the time rather than go to trial sometimes against legitimate plaintiffs, and both legitimate and frivolous plaintiffs, expecting a satisfactory settlement, do not bother to investigate before filing and always accept a defendant’s
offer). These models are particularly complex and do not always predict settlement of frivolous
suits. However, they do predict that frivolous suits will be filed in substantial numbers and will
have adverse social effects. See id. at 550–64 (discussing the “informed-defendant model”).
170. Sometimes it is in the interest of a defendant to adopt a fighting strategy to develop a
reputation for aggressively battling frivolous suits. See Bone, supra note 149, at 539–41 (discussing the possibility of a fighting strategy). Such a reputation can reap benefits in the long run
by discouraging frivolous plaintiffs from filing. For several reasons, however, a fighting strategy
is likely to be much less effective in the class action setting. First, the strategy works only if both
the plaintiff and the defendant know the class action is frivolous, for only then can the defendant target its fighting strategy at frivolous suits and get public credit for doing so. Second, the
class action aggregates lots of the suits that the defendant would otherwise try to deter. With
fewer suits left to reap the benefits of a fighting strategy, the defendant’s incentives to use the
strategy are much weaker. Third, the high potential stakes in a class action make a fighting
strategy very costly if the defendant loses.
171. The analysis is more complex than this and depends to some extent on the structural
features of the various equilibria and the exogenous conditions that support those equilibria.
This Article is not the forum to present a thorough analysis. It is enough to note that the factors
are likely to produce a substantial number of frivolous filings and settlements under a wide
range of conditions.
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one.172 The risk is very different when certification is denied. Assuming that all class members bring individual suits, the defendant has an
opportunity to litigate each suit separately, and the chances are very
173
good that the defendant will win some and lose some. Moreover,
when individual suits are litigated sequentially, plaintiffs and defendants gain information from the earlier cases that helps them assess
the merits of later cases, deal better with frivolous filings, and work
out reasonable settlements for the meritorious suits.174
It is true that corporate defendants tend to be risk-neutral, but
they are likely to become more risk-averse as the potential class-wide
175
liability represents a larger fraction of corporate assets. Further-

172. It is not just the highly publicized mass tort class action that risks potentially crippling
liability. For example, in the retailer class action antitrust suit against the VISA and Mastercard
card associations, the plaintiff class seeks damages that could reach $63 billion, which would total $189 billion after trebling. See In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699,
2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480, at *57, *60, *70–*71 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)
(stressing the enormous potential liability and the coercive effect on settlement).
173. That is, the defendant will win some and lose some assuming no offensive collateral
estoppel on the common issues. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (introducing the possibility of offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel in federal court); Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 345–48 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow offensive
collateral estoppel). To see why this fact alone reduces the risk for the defendant, consider the
following mathematical analysis. Suppose that the class has 1000 members and that each class
member has a 0.1 probability of winning on liability (since the suit is frivolous, the 0.1 is just the
probability of judicial error). If a class is certified, the defendant faces two possible outcomes:
either defendant is held liable to 1000 class members (with a probability of 0.1) or to no class
members (with a probability of 0.9). The mean of this two-point distribution is 900 defendant
wins, and the variance is: 0.9 x (1000 – 900)2 + 0.1 x (900 – 0)2 = 90,000. On the other hand, if certification is denied, there are 1001 possible outcomes. The defendant might win all 1000 individual suits, or he might win 1 suit and lose 999, or he might win 2 suits and lose 998—and so on.
One can calculate the probability distribution over all these possible outcomes. Assuming that
all the outcomes are mutually independent, the distribution can be modeled as a binomial distribution. The mean of the distribution is the same as for the certified class action—900 wins—
but the variance is much smaller: 1000 x 0.1 x 0.9 = 90. The reason for the reduced variance is
that the binomial distribution clusters tightly around the mean of 900 wins, which is to say that
the probability of an outcome close to the mean is very high. One can see this most clearly for
the endpoints of the distribution: while the probability of 1000 losses and 0 wins is 0.1 for a
certified class action, it is a miniscule (0.1)1000 for individual litigation. In general, if the
population of lawsuits is large enough, the binomial distribution closely approximates a normal
distribution. In our case, this means that there is roughly a 95% probability that the defendant
will lose somewhere between 80 and 120 individual suits—a lot less risky situation than facing a
10% chance of losing all 1000 suits.
174. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 442 (1986) (discussing the advantages of mature mass tort
litigation).
175. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the effect of certification on a company’s willingness to take risk); Alexander, supra
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more, class attorneys often sue corporate officers and directors to exploit their greater risk aversion and pressure them to authorize a settlement on behalf of the corporation.176 Indeed, in a world of agency
costs, corporate officers, fearful of losing salary, stock value, and even
jobs—or simply worried about having to account to shareholders for a
huge liability loss—may experience considerable pressure to authorize a settlement that is not optimal for the corporation. It is true that
when defendants know the class action is frivolous, they will presumably assign a low probability to the case succeeding at trial.177
However, even a small probability of success can produce a substantial increase in risk, especially when the number of suits in the class is
very large.178
For the asymmetric-cost model, it is important to consider the effect of certification on the risk-bearing costs of the plaintiff as well,
since that model depends on costs being not only high but also differ179
ent across the party line. Although the matter is not entirely clear,
there is reason to believe that certification has a weaker impact on
plaintiffs’ risk-bearing costs. For example, certification has little effect
on each class member’s individual litigation gamble, since she gets at
most one chance to litigate her case with or without certification.180 As
for the class attorney, certification does create an all-or-nothing gamble, but the class attorney has various ways to manage the risk.181 Unnote 158, at 532 (arguing that “the stakes in many securities class actions are high enough to
threaten the continued existence of the company,” which can generate risk-averse behavior).
176. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 158, at 529–32 (discussing the strategy of securities
fraud plaintiffs to sue risk-averse outside directors for punitive damages to apply pressure on
the corporation to settle); Romano, supra note 160, at 57 (noting the strong settlement incentives for defendants who are corporate officers and directors).
177. This is significant for the asymmetric-cost models but not as significant for the asymmetric-information models. In the asymmetric-information models, it is the defendant’s fear of
having to try a meritorious suit that applies pressure to settle frivolous suits. Therefore, the additional risk-bearing costs in a meritorious suit will increase the plaintiff’s settlement leverage in
a frivolous suit.
178. See supra note 173 (analyzing an example with a ten percent probability of success).
179. This is not essential for asymmetric-information models, since they depend on informational rather than cost asymmetry. It is enough in those models that the defendant’s costs are
high, because avoiding those costs is what drives the defendant’s eagerness to settle.
180. Class litigation requires each class member to give up a considerable amount of individual control, however, and this fact, combined with class attorney agency problems, can increase the risk for class members. Although this increase is difficult to estimate, it is unlikely to
be as substantial as the increase for the defendant, especially if the class attorney assumes some
of the risk through a contingency fee arrangement.
181. For example, the attorney has only his fees and costs at stake, which represent only a
fraction of the total class recovery, while the defendant faces the prospect of paying for the en-
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like defendants, class attorneys can be selective about the class actions they bring, and they have an incentive to select those class actions that maximize the risk differential and thus the settlement leverage. Most important for our purposes, the attorney’s gamble is not
terribly risky when the suit is frivolous or very weak and the attorney
does not intend to take it to trial anyway.182
In addition to increasing the defendant’s risk-bearing costs, certification also increases defendant’s litigation costs by expanding the
scope of a case and opening up more opportunities for strategic litiga183
tion. For example, in an employment discrimination suit, certification of a company-wide class puts company-wide policies or practices
at issue, expanding the opportunities for class counsel to engage in extensive and intrusive discovery. By promulgating a simple document
request, the class attorney can force defendants to engage in a costly
184
search of company records. Moreover, responding to such a request
can sometimes put defendants in the awkward position of having to
reveal marginally relevant but highly embarrassing facts that a settlement would conceal. To be sure, defendants also can make litigation
costly for plaintiffs, but plaintiffs usually have less information to
provide, especially if they are individuals, and are therefore much less
vulnerable to cost-escalating strategies.
Reputation costs also are affected by certification. Turning a case
into a class action elevates its public profile and can attract adverse
publicity unrelated to the merits. Indeed, class representatives and
the class attorney have incentives to exploit the publicity value of a

tire amount. Moreover, by maintaining a portfolio of cases, the class attorney can manage the
risks through diversification. See Coffee, supra note 161, at 704–12 (discussing diversification
and other factors that affect the risk preferences of a class attorney).
182. One more point deserves mention. If plaintiff’s risk-bearing costs are a lot greater than
the defendant’s when suits are litigated individually, it is possible that class certification, rather
than creating a cost asymmetry, will simply eliminate an existing asymmetry. However, this
point does not hold for frivolous or very weak suits, which are the object of our concern, since
there is little risk for plaintiffs who do not intend to try their cases. Even for meritorious suits,
the prevalence of contingency fee arrangements should reduce the risk for plaintiffs litigating
individually. The contingency fee shifts a good deal of that risk to the plaintiff’s attorney, who
can diversify by maintaining a portfolio of cases.
183. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
IND. L.J. 625, 637–39 (1987) (discussing the various ways in which discovery can contribute to a
cost asymmetry that advantages the class over the defendant).
184. Similarly, depositions often are more costly to defend than to take, especially when the
deponent requires careful preparation. When both sides hire experts, there are more opportunities to multiply litigation costs. But the costs rise for both sides, leaving the other sources of
asymmetry to dominate.
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class action to magnify the defendant’s reputation costs and force a
settlement.185 These adverse reputation effects add to defendant’s
costs of litigating and make settlement more attractive in frivolous
suits.
The last factor—judicial settlement pressure—results from the
fact that trial judges have a personal and professional stake in settling
186
large class actions. The judge not only avoids a difficult and burdensome trial, but also enhances her reputation by successfully settling a
major class action. Because of this, judges frequently encourage
(some would even say force) settlement and occasionally appoint special masters to facilitate the bargaining process.187 Indeed, it sometimes seems as if the high probability of class settlement is the cause
of a liberal judicial attitude toward certification: certification followed
by settlement removes many cases from the court docket without the
need for trial and with minimal risk of reversal on appeal. Faced with
a trial judge bent on settlement, the defendant would run a serious
risk if it rejected settlement overtures and held out for trial.
In sum, the theoretical analysis supports the general findings of
most of the rather limited class action empirical studies: almost all
class actions settle; the certification decision gives plaintiffs critical
settlement leverage, and the leverage increases the prospects for
frivolous class action suits. The Eisen rule magnifies the adverse ef185. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Coca-Cola Co., 186 F.R.D. 672, 674–75 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (describing the class attorneys’ media contacts and use of a website to circulate information about a
pending employment discrimination class action).
186. See, e.g., PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 178–79 (1986) (describing how
Judge Weinstein pressured settlement in the Agent Orange class action despite reservations
about liability); Resnik, supra note 15, at 948–49 (discussing the strong judicial preference for
settlement and judicial involvement in settlement bargaining). One practicing lawyer describes
the threats available to a judge in the following, perhaps overly dramatic, terms:
The judicial arsenal contains a wide range of weapons to induce settlement. A judge
can refuse to rule on dispositive motions, thus turning up the heat on the defendant
because of the sheer volume of pending cases. A judge can order that discovery be
permitted into essentially all aspects of corporate life, and can include all suppliers,
distributors, researchers, and other people in the world who have any relationship
with the corporate defendant. A judge can order that depositions be taken at a rate
that resembles the Bataan Death March. The judge may perceive, and perceive accurately, that a corporate defendant will have no choice but to capitulate.
Mark Herrmann, From Saccharin to Breast Implants: Mass Torts, Then and Now, LITIGATION,
at 50, 54 (Fall 1999).
187. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 92 (discussing the role and potential abuses of
special masters). Also, partly because of the strong judicial interest in settlement, trial judges do
a relatively poor job of reviewing class action settlements under Rule 23(e). See id. at 98 (noting
that “the failure of judges to vigorously . . . monitor settlements and lawyers’ fees was a theme
in a number of interviews” with attorneys).
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fects by making it easier for plaintiffs to obtain certification in substantively frivolous cases and in cases otherwise meritorious that
should not be certified.
b. Settlement and reconsideration of certification decisions.
Proposition 2a—false grants can be corrected whereas false denials
are permanent—is premised on the assumption that a trial judge will
revise a favorable certification decision later in the suit if a more
thorough grasp of the evidence and greater experience with the case
show that the initial decision was erroneous. Yet trial judges rarely
reverse certification after granting it.188 This is not surprising given the
strong judicial preference for settlement. When a trial judge believes
that settlement is likely with certification, she has little incentive to
decertify the class. Accordingly, defendants have little incentive to
file motions to decertify, with the result that there should be few such
motions and a high settlement rate—predictions consistent with the
available data.189
Moreover, as we have seen, the high costs of class litigation after
the certification stage create considerable pressure to settle early.
And if the case settles soon after certification, the trial judge never
gets a chance to revisit the initial certification decision. It follows then
that initial certification is, as a practical matter, tantamount to final
certification for most cases.190
c. Settlement and the cost of erroneous certification. Proposition 2b supposes that the cost of a false grant of certification is not
very high compared to the cost of a false denial. The cost of a false
grant is just the cost of managing the class action between the initial
erroneous certification and later correction, but the cost of a false de-

188. The 1995 Federal Judicial Center study of class actions in four federal districts found
that motions to decertify or reconsider a certification decision were filed in only fifteen percent
of the 152 certified class actions studied, WILLGING ET AL., supra note 31, at 175 tbl. 32, and that
judges modified or reversed their certification decisions in only three of these cases. Id. The net
result is that judges alter their certification decisions in only two percent of certified class actions.
189. See id. (reporting motions in only twenty-three of 152 class actions studied).
190. E.g., In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 22480, at *57, *69–*71 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2001). Because of these costs and judicial reluctance to reverse a certification, rational defendants are not likely to hold out long enough to file
a decertification motion, and the remote chance of decertification should have little effect on
the settlement.
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nial is the social loss associated with frustrating the class action’s important social policies.
The high frequency of settlement dramatically changes this simple analysis. With settlement likely and reconsideration of a certification decision highly improbable, the cost of false grants of certifica191
tion must be measured in terms of likely settlement effects. This is
important because erroneous certifications can lead to bad settlements that produce skewed incentives and substantial social losses.
192
As we saw above, the Eisen rule’s generous approach to certification and lack of attention to the merits make the class action an attractive vehicle for frivolous suits. Frivolous litigation generates social
costs wherever it exists, but these costs are particularly acute in the
class action setting because the scale of the class action magnifies the
adverse effects. In particular, frivolous suits waste social resources,
and their settlement can skew incentives in socially undesirable
ways—a particularly troubling prospect in large class actions where a
single settlement can cover thousands, even hundreds of thousands,
of frivolous suits. Companies are deterred from engaging in socially
beneficial activities for fear of being targeted. Moreover, high stakes
class litigation can threaten to bankrupt a socially valuable firm. And
the time spent dealing with frivolous cases harms companies by diverting valuable management resources from more productive uses.
A prime example of a frivolous suit leading to an enormous settlement is the breast implant litigation against Dow Corning and
193
other manufacturers. These suits alleged that leakage from implants
caused immunological and other disorders.194 After the Food and
Drug Administration banned silicone gel implants for cosmetic purposes and plaintiffs’ groups and the media publicized the issue, a large

191. Also, a false grant can harm absent class members if the named plaintiffs are not typical
or adequate class representatives and the case settles or loses at trial with preclusive effects for
the entire class. See Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1556 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that
a class representative who failed to establish a specific pattern of discrimination in her individual case might produce an inappropriate result for other class members).
192. See supra Part III.D.2.
193. For a more detailed account of the events briefly summarized here, see generally David
E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457 (1999) (reviewing MARCIA
ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE
BREAST IMPLANT CASE (1996)); Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Scientific Authority: The
Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond, 86 VA. L. REV. 801 (2000) (discussing the uses of scientific panel results in breast implant litigation and other mass tort cases).
194. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994).
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number of women brought suit against Dow Corning and other
manufacturers. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred these suits, and the transfer order eventually resulted in over
21,000 cases being consolidated in the Northern District of Alabama.195 The manufacturers ultimately settled all the cases for more
than four billion dollars, but the settlement collapsed after more
women asserted claims on the settlement fund than the parties had
anticipated. In the end, Dow Corning had to declare bankruptcy.196
At the time of these events, plaintiffs lacked credible scientific
support for their medical theories, and since that time, additional
197
medical studies have cast serious doubt on their allegations. These
studies have shown, for example, that immunological disorders are no
more common in women with breast implants than in those without
them.198 Indeed, since the class action settlement, at least one court
has found that the plaintiffs’ proffered scientific testimony should be
excluded.199
The breast implant settlement took place in the context of a settlement class action aimed at achieving a global resolution of all the
claims, and Dow Corning sought the settlement to avoid the potentially crippling liability of class and individual litigation. Yet the case
provides a good illustration of how frivolous lawsuits (as defined
here) can lead to large settlements and of the need to have a review
of the merits at an early enough stage to detect cases that lack sufficient foundation to go forward.
In sum, an erroneous certification decision can encourage substantial settlements in frivolous class action suits, and it can also enhance the plaintiffs’ settlement leverage and litigating power in meritorious suits that should not be certified. The magnitude of these
effects will vary with the particular circumstances of the class action
195. Walker & Monahan, supra note 193, at 805.
196. Id. at 806.
197. See Bernstein, supra note 193, at 459–64 (“[P]laintiffs in the breast implant litigation
never presented any sound scientific evidence that implants cause systemic diseases such as cancer and connective-tissue diseases caused by immune-system malfunctions.”).
198. Not only have medical studies demonstrated no causal link between breast implants
and the disorders the plaintiffs complained about, see id. at 480–84 (discussing the findings of
epidemiological studies), but a panel of distinguished scientists appointed by the Alabama federal district judge in the consolidated proceeding found “no sufficient scientific basis to link silicone implants to either connective tissue diseases or immune system dysfunctions,” Walker &
Monahan, supra note 193, at 810, and a later report by the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academy of Sciences came to the same conclusion, id. at 812.
199. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392, 1414–15 (D. Or. 1996).
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suit, including the degree of the defendant’s risk aversion, the estimate of potential class-wide liability, cash flow constraints, agency
dynamics, reputation costs, and the like. But for our purposes it is
enough to note that the cost of erroneous certifications is much more
serious than Proposition 2b assumes.
d. The cost of erroneous certification denials. Proposition 2b
also assumes that a failure to certify will scuttle the class action altogether. This assumption is what justifies the claim that erroneous denials of certification are likely to be very costly. However, the assumption is wrong as to most class actions. The consequences of a
false denial are much less serious than Proposition 2b assumes.
To see why, we must distinguish between three different categories of class action. The first category includes (b)(3) and (b)(2) class
actions with claims large enough to justify individual suits. The second category includes (b)(1) class actions with cost-justified individual suits that risk creating serious externalities. And the third category includes (b)(3) class actions with small claims insufficient to
support individual suits. This classification scheme tracks the most
common functional divisions among class actions. The difference between class actions with large claims and those with small claims is
that for large claims, a false denial does not prevent the plaintiffs
from obtaining relief through individual litigation, while for smaller
claims it can. So too, the reason for isolating those class actions designed to avoid serious externalities has to do with the adverse consequences of an erroneous certification denial in such cases.
i. Cost-justified (b)(3) and (b)(2) suits. When class members have enough at stake to justify litigating individual suits, an erroneous denial of certification does not prevent enforcement of the substantive law. It merely leaves the named plaintiffs and absent class
members free to proceed with individual litigation apart from a class
action.
Moreover, an erroneous denial of certification does not necessarily doom the class action completely. For one thing, the named
plaintiffs, if they continue with their individual suits, might be able to
obtain later reconsideration of a negative certification decision when
more information is available.200 Also, since a denial of certification
200. Rule 23(c)(1)’s certification timing requirement might get in the way, but there is no
sound reason not to certify later if no one is prejudiced by the delay. It seems reasonable, how-
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has no preclusive effect on absent class members not in privity with
the named plaintiffs,201 it is open to a later court to certify a class action in a suit brought by an absent class member—if intervening
202
events show that the earlier denial of certification was erroneous.
Thus, the cost of a false denial for the first category of class actions is mainly the public and private cost of litigating the first few
suits on an individual basis—not the much greater cost of preventing
substantive law enforcement altogether or even of scuttling a class action. Furthermore, this cost is offset to some extent by the benefits of
individual litigation. For example, if plaintiffs prevail in their individual suits, the class might be able to use offensive issue preclusion
against the common defendant to avoid duplicative litigation in the
203
later class suit. Moreover, litigation of a few individual suits will
supply information that should be useful for reducing transaction
costs and facilitating successful settlement bargaining in a later class
suit.204 To be sure, the class action helps plaintiffs spread litigation
costs, but plaintiffs can achieve some of these benefits through voluntary joinder on a smaller scale or through litigation committees and
other informal modes of cooperation.

ever, to suppose that a judge would be reluctant to certify after the individual suits have progressed substantially toward trial.
201. See Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 484–85 (2000)
(noting that “because only parties or their privies are bound by decisions against them and because absent class members are not bound by decisions entered in class litigation until the class
is certified, an order denying certification ordinarily will not be binding” in class actions filed by
different class representatives); see also J.R. Clearwater, Inc., v. Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d
176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Accordingly, it seems apparent to us that the denial of class certification similarly lacks sufficient finality to be entitled to preclusive effect while the underlying litigation remains pending.”).
202. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals assumed just this when it held that class certification in Castano was premature. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir.
1996).
203. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (concluding that federal
courts should not preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel but should grant trial courts
broad discretion to determine when it should be applied). But see Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing to allow offensive issue preclusion).
204. This assumes that information available to the attorneys in individual suits also will be
available to the attorney in the class suit. This is a reasonable assumption as there is a great deal
of overlap in legal representation of class members and considerable informal sharing of information among lawyers. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and
Ethical Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381,
386–408 (2000) (describing the pervasive nature of informal coordination and information
sharing among lawyers).
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ii. Cost-justified (b)(1) suits. The second category of class
action includes those suits for which certification is sought under subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 23, and sometimes under subdivision (b)(2)
when it involves similar concerns, such as a risk that individual suits
will produce conflicting decrees imposing inconsistent obligations on
205
the defendant. In these cases, a class action is authorized because
individual lawsuits risk imposing serious externalities on the defendant or other class members. For example, certification under (b)(1)
is allowed in “limited fund” situations, in which the defendant’s assets
are insufficient to satisfy all the claims and a class action allows for an
equitable distribution of the fund.206 Also, certification is allowed under (b)(1)—and sometimes under (b)(2)—in situations where the defendant faces a risk of inconsistent judicial decrees if class members
sue separately.207
These class actions, like those in the first category, involve class
members who have enough at stake to justify individual litigation;
otherwise, there would be no reason to worry about externalities
since there would be no individual suits. However, a false denial of
certification is potentially more serious for these cases than for cases
in the first category. The reason is that individual litigation may create the very externalities that the class action was meant to prevent.
Still, a false denial no more precludes all class actions in these
cases than it does in the first category. It is still possible for a court to
certify a class in a later suit, after there has been some individual litigation by class members. Moreover, the social cost of tolerating individual suits depends on the kind of externality at stake. In “limited
fund” situations under subdivision (b)(1)(B), a few individual suits

205. Certification sometimes is granted under Rule 23(b)(2) because an injunction is the
primary form of relief even though the case also presents externality risks that would qualify it
under (b)(1). For example, civil rights class actions seeking broad structural relief usually are
certified under (b)(2), but they also might qualify under (b)(1) because of the risk that individual suits could generate incompatible decrees. See generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1775, at 489 (noting that actions under (b)(2) may also qualify under (b)(1) or
(b)(3)).
206. See Arthur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present, and Future,
4 JUST. SYS. J. 197, 211 (1978) (arguing that individual cases should be converted into a class
action when there are multiple claimants to a limited fund such as insurance proceeds or trust
assets).
207. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Nat’l Football League, 584 F.2d 280, 283–84 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting the propriety of allowing certification under Rule 23(b)(1) to avoid inconsistent adjudication).
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should not present a serious problem unless the fund is extremely
limited.208
Incompatible decrees present a potentially more serious problem. If a judge orders broad injunctive or declaratory relief in an individual suit, other judges could end up issuing inconsistent decrees in
subsequent suits or in a later class action. However, this scenario
209
should not be terribly common. Often the same lack of commonality that prevents certification of a class also will prevent broad relief
in an individual suit, thereby eliminating any risk of incompatible decrees. For example, certification of a single company-wide class challenging employment discrimination across the board is proper only if
210
the discrimination has a common thread at the company level.
Without such commonality, any challenge must target practices at a
lower level of the company, such as department-by-department or supervisor-by-supervisor. In such a case, the proper scope of injunctive
relief also would be narrowly tailored to the localized wrong. Moreover, if it appears from these targeted lawsuits that a common thread in
fact exists, the judge always can reconsider his earlier certification
denial and correct his error.
Even so, when a false denial results in different courts entering
contradictory decrees, the social costs can be quite high. For this reason, it might be wise to indulge a somewhat more generous approach
to certification when the risk of contradictory decrees is substantial.
A court still would examine merits-related evidence rigorously, but it
also might recognize a presumption in favor of certification and certify on a somewhat lower threshold probability of success to reduce
the risk of false denials.

208. And if the fund is extremely limited, this fact should be relatively easy to prove, so a
judge is not likely to make an error in evaluating the merits for purposes of calculating an expected value for the class claims and determining whether the fund is actually limited.
209. The cases that pose the most serious risks tend to fit into paradigmatic situations; for
example, civil rights suits seeking structural injunctive relief, or constitutional challenges to corporate, municipal, or state action. Therefore, the risk of incompatible decrees usually should be
apparent from the outset, so the likelihood of a false denial should be quite small.
210. See supra note 59–60 and accompanying text. At least insofar as they are limited to injunctive and declaratory relief, class actions challenging employment discrimination usually are
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) rather than Rule 23(b)(1)(A). 7A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 3, § 1776, at 495–96; see also Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 647 F.2d 388, 393 (3d Cir. 1981)
(“A class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a pattern or practice of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII is obviously the paradigm of a Rule 23(b)(2) class
action.”). However, the point is the same no matter what subdivision is used for certification.
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iii. Small-claim (b)(3) suits. Class actions with small
claims that are certified under subdivision (b)(3) present a different
situation. In these cases, the class action solves a collective action
211
problem. By bringing a class action, the class attorney is able to aggregate all the small claims into a single lawsuit with enough at stake
to make litigation profitable. Thus, the adverse consequences of an
erroneous denial of certification may seem quite significant at first
glance. Because by assumption class members have too little at stake
to bring individual suits, denial of certification can frustrate private
enforcement of the substantive law.
The cost of false denials, however, is not likely to be so serious.
The main purpose of the small-claim class action is deterrence, not
compensation. Typically, class members have too little at stake to
make individual compensation a significant private or public objective
212
given the enormous social costs of class litigation. Instead, the class
action empowers the class attorney as a private attorney general to
internalize the social costs of defendant’s acts and deter wrongdo213
ing.
A reasonable level of deterrence can be achieved even with a
significant risk of erroneous certification denials. For one thing, the
deterrent effect of the class action is a function of its litigation costs as

211. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role
in Class Actions and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (recommending new policies to regulate large-scale, smallclaim litigation).
212. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 68–72 (focusing on the deterrence objective). This is not to say that compensation has no social value at all; rather, its value is so small
given the small stakes that the deterrence goal dominates. Put another way, it is extremely unlikely that the class action would be allowed at all for small claims without the deterrence rationale. It is true that total damages for the class as a whole can be enormous, but compensation
should be evaluated on an individual, not an aggregate, basis. Because the class is not an organized entity capable of benefiting collectively from an aggregate recovery, the only sensible way
to assess the social value of compensation is in terms of the benefit to each class member individually, and that benefit is typically quite small. But see David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 924–25, 956 (1998) (arguing that the
small-claimant class should be viewed as an entity).
213. See Macey & Miller, supra note 211, at 8–11 (arguing that the class action suit provides
an effective and inexpensive procedure for joining large numbers of plaintiffs). For example, the
attorney for the class in a securities fraud class action can look forward to receiving a large fee
as a proportion of the aggregate class recovery if the suit succeeds. This creates a substantial
incentive for the attorney to sue and hold firms legally accountable, which in turn creates a deterrent effect.
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well as the expectation of liability it generates.214 Consider a firm deciding whether to engage in conduct that might violate the law and
create widely dispersed and relatively small injuries to a large number
of individuals. The firm will consider the potential risk of liability and
discount this risk by the probability of an erroneous certification denial. However, the firm also will consider the litigation cost of a class
action if one is certified. As long as there is a sufficiently high probability of class certification, the firm will choose to comply with the
law even when it anticipates a less than perfectly accurate certification procedure, rather than risk having to pay for class action litigation in the event a class is certified.215
In addition, the class action is not the only deterrence device for
cases involving small claims; deterrence also can be achieved through
public enforcement. For example, the Securities Exchange Commission has power to enforce the federal securities laws, the Federal
Trade Commission has power to enforce the antitrust laws, and federal agencies and state attorneys general have power to enforce fed216
eral and state consumer protection laws. To be sure, public enforcement is limited by budgetary and legal constraints, and for this
reason, private enforcement through the class action is thought to be
a valuable supplement. Still, it is important to bear in mind that the
class action need not do all the deterrence work by itself.
Finally, the fact that many small-claimant classes include a few
members with large claims also mitigates the adverse effect of false
certification denials. For example, a securities fraud class often has a
few, and sometimes quite a few, large institutional investors with

214. However, the high rate of class action settlement can reduce this deterrent effect insofar as the defendant saves litigation costs when the case settles. In an extreme case—where litigation costs are the same for the class and the defendant, the probability of success and likely
judgment are common knowledge, and the surplus is split equally—the defendant ends up paying nothing in litigation costs. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Deterrent
Effects of Settlements and Trials, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 109, 114 (1988) (examining the deterrent effect of litigation costs as well as liability).
215. This assumes, of course, that substantive rules of liability and remedy have not already
been adjusted to account for the deterrent effect of litigation costs. To formalize the point, let w
be the probability of certification, let p be the probability that the class attorney will win the suit
if a class is certified, let x be the expected judgment if the class wins, and let cD be the cost to the
defendant of litigating a class action. Assuming that the class action is the only vehicle for holding the firm accountable, then the potential cost to the firm is: w(px + cD) = wpx + wcD. If px is
the ideal amount of cost internalization (i.e. where w = 1, and cD does not figure in the choice of
substantive rules that determine p and x), then the ideal is achieved for a value of w less than 1;
i.e. at w = px/(px + cD).
216. In addition, criminal penalties can be imposed for particularly egregious violations.
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enough at stake to justify individual suits.217 Their presence has two
important implications. First, even if a class action is erroneously denied, there is still a possibility of a partial deterrence benefit if large
218
claimants bring individual suits. Second, an erroneous denial of certification need not doom the class action completely. If institutional
investors bring individual suits, an enterprising attorney can rely on
the information developed in those suits to try for certification again
in a later class action limited to the small claims.219
Therefore, in the third category of class actions—(b)(3) damages
suits involving only (or mainly) small claims—the cost of false certification denials is in fact much less serious than Proposition 2b assumes. The main function of the class action for small claims is deterrence, and substantial deterrence benefits can still be achieved even
220
with a significant risk of false denials.
217. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
395–400 (2001) (collecting data on the prevalence of institutional investors, and noting that the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 assumes that institutional investors will play a
substantial role in securities fraud class litigation); Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 158, at 2088–
94 (examining the prevalence of institutional investors in class action suits). Moreover, antitrust
class actions also can include class members with very large claims. For example, the VISA
Check/MasterMoney antitrust class action includes a large number of merchants with relatively
small claims, but also some with damage claims that are likely to total in the hundreds of millions of dollars. Indeed, the named plaintiffs include large, well-financed corporations such as
Wal-Mart, The Limited, Sears-Roebuck, and Circuit City. In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480, at *72 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001) (Jacobs,
J., dissenting) (noting that “de-certification would not doom this litigation” because of the presence of large claims and estimating that Wal-Mart’s recovery could “reach a quarter billion
dollars (with trebling and before attorneys’ fees) for 1999 alone”).
218. It is true that large institutional investors have in the past been reluctant to act as class
representatives in securities fraud class actions because of the litigation burden, the adverse
publicity and reputation effects, and other factors. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 158, at 2095–
105. But institutional investors are taking a more active role in class litigation since enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. Rubenstein, supra note 217, at 398. And in any
event, without a class action in which to hide, one would expect institutional investors to sue
individually when they suffer substantial losses.
219. This strategy is limited to some extent by free-rider problems. If there is more than one
large institutional investor, for example, each investor might choose not to file in the hope that
one of the others files first.
220. In addition to the error-cost argument criticized in the text, there is another reason that
a judge might certify a class action without inquiring into the merits of the competing claims. He
simply might disagree with the policy choices embodied in Rule 23 or the substantive law and
seek to circumvent those choices by granting class certification even when plaintiffs are not entitled to recover or to bring a class action under the applicable law. In this situation, the judge
chooses to ignore the merits not because a preliminary determination is too difficult or too
prone to error, but instead because it is likely to produce a result in the defendant’s favor, which
is at odds with the judge’s preferred outcome. Whether the judge is correct as a policy matter is
irrelevant; he has a duty to apply Rule 23 and the substantive law as they exist and not circum-
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e. Summary of Proposition 2 analysis. Combining the different strands of the previous analysis, we can make the following rough
assessment of Proposition 2. First, for (b)(3) class actions involving
large claims, especially mass torts, the relative cost of the two errors is
probably just the opposite of what Proposition 2 states. In these cases,
the cost of a false grant of certification is the social cost of a settlement leveraged improperly through the power of the class action,
whereas the cost of a false denial is mostly just the net cost of litigating a few individual suits.
The error-cost comparison for (b)(3) class actions involving small
claims is less certain. The cost of a false grant is still the cost of an improperly leveraged settlement, but the cost of a false denial is the cost
of denying a remedy to deserving claims (at least if there is no other
opportunity to form a class). Still, because the class action in these
cases is mainly about deterrence and because deterrence can be
achieved without perfect accuracy at the certification stage, the cost
of false denials is likely to be much lower than Proposition 2b assumes.
It is only in the case of (b)(1), and to some extent (b)(2), class actions involving potentially inconsistent decrees that we can say with
some confidence that Proposition 2 is likely to hold true. A false denial risks reducing the benefits of the class action by opening up the
possibility of inconsistent relief. Even so, the seriousness of this
problem is reduced to a large extent by the fact that the risk of error
is quite small in these cases and the most problematic situations are
not all that likely to arise.
3. The Flaws in Proposition 3. To recap the discussion so far, we
set out in this Section to show that the error-cost argument for the
Eisen rule is flawed, and that, properly understood, it supports a
stricter review of the merits at the certification stage. We started by
breaking the error-cost argument into three propositions. We saw
that Proposition 1 (Rule E reduces false denials but increases false
grants) is valid, but that Proposition 2 (a false denial is more costly
than a false grant) is flawed. Because of the high incidence of settlevent their prescriptions by subterfuge. Policy questions like these should be decided centrally—
through the formal rulemaking process established by the Rules Enabling Act in the case of
Rule 23, and through the legislative process in the case of substantive antitrust law. See generally
Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy,
and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999) (advocating a centralized and uniform rulemaking process for important procedural rules).
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ment in class actions, a decision to certify a class is likely to be final
rather than provisional—contrary to Proposition 2a. Moreover,
Proposition 2b exaggerates the costs of false certification denials and
underestimates the cost of false grants.
These points taken together challenge the conclusions of Proposition 3. To see why, let us return to the hypothetical choice between
Rule E (the pure Eisen rule) and Rule N (our proposed alternative).
Let us make the additional assumption—a modest one given the previous analysis—that false grants of certification and false denials are
equally costly. If we can show that Rule N is superior when the two
kinds of error create the same cost, then a fortiori it must be superior
when the cost of false certification grants is higher.
When error costs are equal, the choice between Rule E and Rule
N turns solely on the total number of errors each rule is likely to create, and Rule E is likely to create more errors than Rule N. The intuition is easy to state. Rule E creates a high risk of false grants by indulging a generous approach to certification. With a generous
approach, Rule E also creates additional incentives for plaintiffs to
file frivolous class action suits. The combination of these two factors—a high rate of erroneous certifications and a large number of
frivolous class action suits—means that Rule E produces a large total
number of errors.
Rule N, on the other hand, substantially reduces the risk of false
grants and with it the incentive to file frivolous suits. Of course, Rule
N also increases the risk of false denials, and this additional risk might
also discourage the filing of some meritorious certification motions.
But these adverse effects should not be serious. The availability of
precertification discovery coupled with careful judicial review at the
certification stage should keep the number of false denials in check,
unless there is some special reason to worry about limited information access or cognitive bias. Moreover, a relatively small risk of false
denials should have little impact on the filing of meritorious certification motions given the considerable benefits of class certification.
Therefore, Rule E increases false grants and invites more frivolous filings, two effects that combine to produce a large total number
of errors, whereas Rule N mostly just adds to the risk of false denials,
a marginal effect limited by an overall improvement of accuracy at
the certification stage. As a result, Rule E is likely to produce more
total errors than Rule N under almost all plausible factual scenarios.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical. The numbers
in this hypothetical are fictional, but they have been chosen to be
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consistent with the incentive analysis and limited empirical data discussed in previous Sections. Moreover, we show at the conclusion of
our discussion that the same results hold true under a wide range of
numerical assumptions.221
Suppose that when Rule E is in effect it attracts frivolous class
action suits, so that 30% of the cases filed as class actions are in fact
222
frivolous in the sense that they should not be certified. Suppose as
well that in using Rule E a judge grants certification 70% of the time
when the case is one that in fact should not be certified and denies
certification 10% of the time when the case is one that in fact should
be certified.223
By contrast, when using Rule N, a judge erroneously grants certification much less often—assume 20% of the time—and because Rule
N’s stricter approach deters frivolous filings, the fraction of frivolous
class actions drops—say, from 30% to 15%. At the same time, however, Rule N increases the risk of erroneous denials—assume that the
risk doubles from 10% to 20%. This reflects the stricter approach of
Rule N, and also the salutary impact of limited precertification discovery and careful judicial review. And for simplicity, assume that
224
Rule N does not discourage the filing of meritorious class actions.
On these assumptions, it is easy to show that Rule N is superior
to Rule E on error-cost grounds when the two errors have the same
cost. The table below shows the probability of error under each rule.
This probability is the risk that the court will commit a particular type
of error (a false grant or a false denial) discounted by the probability
that the case will be one for which the particular kind of error is possible. For example, what we label “false grant probability” equals the
risk of an erroneous certification multiplied by the fraction of class
225
action suits that in fact should not be certified.

221. See infra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
222. The thirty percent figure is reasonable given Rule E’s laxity and consistent with the
analysis of frivolous litigation incentives in Part III.D.2.
223. These assumptions reflect the fact that Rule E forbids consideration of the merits and
indulges a strong presumption in favor of certification.
224. This last assumption is quite plausible, but it is also unnecessary to the results. In fact,
Rule N remains superior even when it deters some meritorious filings. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
225. Thus, the table reflects the fact that the total number of false grant (false denial) errors
depends not only on the false grant (false denial) error risk but also on the number of cases in
which the particular kind of error can occur. For example, if plaintiffs filed only certifiable class
actions, there never would be any possibility of a false grant. More precisely, the risk of false
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ERROR PROBABILITIES
RULE E

RULE N

False grant probability

0.7 x 0.3 = 0.21

0.2 x 0.15 = 0.03

False denial probability

0.1 x 0.7 = 0.07

0.2 x 0.85 = 0.17

0.28

0.20

Total probability of error

Thus, Rule N is superior because it produces a lower total probability of error (20%) than Rule E (28%). This result holds true over
a wide range of different values for the parameters. For example,
Rule N remains superior even when the risk of a false grant under
Rule E drops from 70% to 50% (with all other variables held constant),226 and also when the background fraction of frivolous class action suits falls from 30% to 20% (again with all other variables held
227
constant). Moreover, fixing the background fraction of frivolous
class action suits at 40%, Rule N remains superior even if Rule E
eliminates absolutely all false denials—as long as Rule E also produces false grants with a probability in excess of 50%.228 Finally, Rule
grants (false denials) in the hypothetical is a conditional probability, whereas the label “false
grant probability” (“false denial probability”) in the table denotes an unconditional probability.
226. When the false grant probability is at 50%, the table looks like this:
RULE E

RULE N

False grant probability

0.5 x 0.3 = 0.15

0.2 x 0.15 = 0.03

False denial probability

0.1 x 0.7 = 0.07

0.2 x 0.85 = 0.17

0.22

0.20

Total probability of error
227.

When 20% of the class actions are frivolous, the table looks like this:
RULE E

RULE N

False grant probability

0.7 x 0.2 = 0.14

0.2 x 0.15 = 0.03

False denial probability

0.1 x 0.8 = 0.08

0.2 x 0.85 = 0.17

0.22

0.20

Total probability of error

228. If the conditional probability of a false grant under Rule E is 0.5 and the conditional
probability of a false denial is 0.0, then the error risk table looks like this:
RULE E

RULE N

False grant probability

0.5 x 0.4 = 0.20

0.2 x 0.15 = 0.03

False denial probability

0.0 x 0.6 = 0.00

0.2 x 0.85 = 0.17

0.20

0.20

Total probability of error

BONE.DOC

1316

03/18/02 3:22 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:1251

N remains superior even if the risk of false denials adversely affects
229
filing incentives in meritorious class actions.
Again, the specific numbers in this hypothetical are not particularly important. We chose them simply to illustrate how easy it is for
230
Rule N to end up as the better choice. Certainly, Rule N is not al-

229. The error risk analysis is more complicated under these conditions. To take account of
effects on filing incentives, one must focus on potential class action suits, that is, suits that could
be class actions but have not yet been filed, and consider how many of those potential suits will
be filed under each rule. To illustrate, suppose that 30% of potential class actions are frivolous
and 70% are meritorious. Suppose that Rule E’s generous approach to certification encourages
everyone with a potential class action to file. Furthermore, suppose that Rule N’s stricter approach has a deterrent effect on both frivolous and meritorious filings, so that frivolous class
actions are filed only 40% of the time and meritorious class actions only 80% of the time (i.e.,
20% are deterred). These figures are probably high, but they are chosen to make the toughest
case for Rule N. Assume that false grant and false denial error probabilities are the same as in
the original example (i.e., 70% and 10% respectively for Rule E, and 20% and 20% respectively
for Rule N).
The new element in the analysis has to do with the calculation of false negative probability under Rule N. There are now two ways that a false negative can arise: by the court failing
to certify a meritorious class action (a false denial) or by a plaintiff failing to file. Nevertheless,
Rule N is still the superior choice. The new error risk table looks like this:

False grant probability
False denial or nonfiling probability
Total probability of error

RULE E
0.7 x 0.30 = 0.21
0.1 x 0.70 = 0.07
0.28

RULE N
0.2 x 0.4 x 0.3 = 0.024
0.2 x 0.8 x 0.7 + 0.2 x 0.7 = 0.252
0.276

230. In fact, Rule N still can be the better choice even when the cost of a false denial exceeds the cost of a false grant. To illustrate, suppose that under Rule E, 50% of the cases filed as
class actions are in fact not certifiable. Suppose also that courts using Rule E grant certification
erroneously 70% of the time and deny certification erroneously 10% of the time. Further, when
courts apply Rule N, they mistakenly grant and deny certification with the same probability,
20%, and the fraction of class actions that are not certifiable drops to 30%. (Also assume for
simplicity that Rule N does not deter meritorious filings.) The error risk table looks like this:
RULE E

RULE N

False grant probability

0.7 x 0.5 = 0.35

0.2 x 0.3 = 0.06

False denial probability

0.1 x 0.5 = 0.05

0.2 x 0.7 = 0.14

Here we cannot simply add the false grant and false denial probabilities, as we did with the
other hypotheticals, because false grant and false denial error costs are not necessarily equal.
Yet it is easy to see from the table that Rule N is the superior choice even when false denials are
more costly than false grants. Indeed, false denials can be three times as costly. For in that case,
the total expected error cost for Rule E (normalizing a false grant cost to 1) is: 0.35 + 0.05 x 3 =
0.50. And the total expected error cost for Rule N is: 0.06 + 0.14 x 3 = 0.48.
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ways superior, but the factual scenarios in which it is superior are far
more probable than those in which it is not.231
E. The Process-Cost Argument
Error costs are not the only kind of costs that matter for evaluating a procedural rule. Any cost-benefit analysis must take account
of process costs as well. Process costs include litigation, opportunity,
and other private costs that parties actually incur in litigating a case,
232
as well as the public cost of supporting the court system.
Applied to our choice between Rule E and Rule N, the processcost argument is fairly straightforward. Rule E should not be very
costly to administer because it avoids a burdensome inquiry into the
merits. Rule N, on the other hand, requires that the parties expend

231. This point can be analyzed mathematically as follows. Let p1 be the background fraction of noncertifiable class action suits in a procedural world with Rule E in effect, and let p2 be
the fraction when Rule N is in effect. Similarly, let r1 (r2) be the probability that the judge falsely
grants certification when Rule E (Rule N) is in effect; and let s1 (s2) be the probability that the
judge falsely denies certification when Rule E (Rule N) is in effect. Let cG be the social cost of a
false grant and cD the social cost of a false denial. (Also assume for simplicity that Rule N does
not deter meritorious filings.)
Rule E’s expected error cost (EC1) equals r1p1cG + s1(1 – p1)cD. Rule N’s expected error cost
(EC2) equals r2p2cG + s2(1 – p2)cD. Rule N is superior to Rule E on error-cost grounds if and only if
EC1 > EC2; that is
r1p1cG + s1(1 – p1)cD > r2p2cG + s2(1 – p2)cD
Rearranging, we get
cD/cG < [r1p1 – r2p2]/[ s2(1 – p2) – s1(1 – p1)]

(1)

If we assume that the costs of the two errors are the same and that Rule N produces a symmetric error risk, then cG = cD and s2 = r2.. On these assumptions, inequality (1) becomes
1 < [r1p1 – r2p2]/[r2(1 – p2) – s1(1 – p1)]
Rearranging and reducing gives the following condition:
p1 > (r2 – s1)/(r1 – s1)

(2)

It is easy to see why inequality (2) is likely to hold as a general matter. Because Rule E
is meant to guard against false denials by strongly favoring certification, s1 should be quite small
and r1 should be comparatively large. As a result, r1– s1 should be large. Assuming judges are not
terribly error prone under Rule N, it also is likely that r2 – s1 is quite small. Therefore, (r2 – s1)/(r1
– s1) should be small. Finally, because Rule E encourages strategic filings of frivolous class action suits, p1 is likely to be relatively large—and thus likely to exceed (r2 – s1)/(r1 – s1), as inequality (2) requires.
232. For example, error costs could be reduced substantially by allowing ten trials instead of
one and selecting the majority result on liability or the average of the ten verdicts as the final
judgment in the case. See Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15
THEORY & DECISION 261, 264–65 (1983) (discussing how iteration can improve accuracy by
virtue of the Condorcet Theorem). However, the additional process costs of a ten-trial rule
would be extremely high, almost certainly greater than the marginal benefit in terms of errorcost reduction.
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resources on merits-related discovery and requires the judge to spend
time hearing argument and deliberating on the merits. It follows that
Rule N’s process costs are likely to be greater than Rule E’s. If the
difference is large enough, it can overwhelm Rule N’s error-cost advantage.233
At first glance, it might seem that this argument exaggerates the
process-cost difference between Rule E and Rule N. After all, the
additional discovery required by Rule N probably would occur under
Rule E in any event—just after rather than before certification.
Moreover, since the defendant is likely to press its merits-related objections through a later motion to decertify or for summary judgment,
Rule E will not eliminate hearing and deliberation costs; it simply will
shift them to a later stage.
However, this superficial response ignores the fact that most
class actions settle. Settlement avoids the usual process costs of litigating a case. Therefore, if certified class actions are likely to settle
before significant discovery has taken place and before any motion to
decertify or motion for summary judgment is filed, then Rule E
should generate less process cost than Rule N. In other words, because Rule E is less costly at the certification stage, it should be less
costly overall if settlement brings the case to a quick postcertification
234
conclusion.
Even so, two factors limit the size of the process-cost differential.
First, Rule E, with its more lenient approach to certification, should
attract more class action suits and thus create a need for more certification hearings. Furthermore, most of these additional suits are likely
to be frivolous or marginal. As a result, under Rule E the certification

233. We separate the error-cost argument from the process-cost argument for purposes of
clarity and also to allow for the possibility that process costs measured in economic units might
have to be combined with error costs measured in moral units. Error costs need not be strictly
financial or economic; they can be moral as well. For example, suppose that a judge erroneously
denies certification of a civil rights class action and as a result the plaintiffs never obtain the
broad injunctive remedy to which they were entitled. As the substance of the case involves civil
rights, there is arguably more at stake than simple economic loss. The cost of the error—a failure to redress systemic discrimination—might be thought to have a moral dimension as well—at
least if moral harm results when the law does not enforce important rights individuals possess as
a matter of political morality. Thus, in some cases, error costs might involve a qualitative balancing of nonquantifiable moral harms. If so, then the economic costs of process would somehow have to be combined with the moral costs of error.
234. Of course, settlements can create serious problems on error-cost grounds, as we have
already seen, but settlement would, according to this analysis, keep Rule E’s process costs low.
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issues will be hotly contested and the cost of the additional hearings
under Rule E will be higher than average.
Second, Rule E is likely to increase the process-cost burden at
later stages of the litigation whenever class actions do not settle
quickly after certification. For example, the more frivolous class actions there are in the system, the more occasions there are for defendants to bring summary judgment motions and the greater the process
costs at the summary judgment stage. This factor might already be incorporated into the error-cost analysis if the additional litigation and
administrative burden is folded into the cost of a false grant. But if
235
not, it should be treated as an additional component of process cost.
These two factors—a greater number of certification hearings
and higher process costs at later stages—undermine the process-cost
argument for Rule E. Indeed, Rule E’s process costs could well be
higher than Rule N’s, but there is no way to be sure without more
empirical evidence.
F. Summary
In sum, none of the conventional arguments—those based on the
text of Rule 23, the risk of prejudice, or the importance of maintaining the substance/procedure dichotomy and preserving the integrity
of the Federal Rules scheme—support continuation of the Eisen rule.
More important, a careful examination of the costs and benefits favors abolishing the rule and replacing it with a rigorous review of the
evidence and a preliminary evaluation of the merits at the certification stage.
To be sure, reliable empirical evidence is scarce. But when a
choice must be made with limited data, the best course of action is to
choose the rule that in theory is most likely to be superior—unless
235. Another point is worth mentioning. As we have seen, Rule N does two things: it reduces false certification grants and it also discourages the filing of frivolous class actions. Rule
E, on the other hand, does only one thing: it reduces false certification denials. It does nothing
to discourage frivolous suits; indeed, it actually encourages the filing of frivolous suits. This
means that if Rule E is adopted, frivolous class actions will have to be deterred in some other
way. Whatever method is chosen will generate its own process costs, which will have to be
counted in any comprehensive comparative analysis of the two rules. For example, if the procedural system opts for strict pleading and stronger Rule 11 penalties—as the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act currently does for securities fraud class actions, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000)—then defendants will file more early motions to dismiss and more motions for sanctions.
See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397 (1993) (analyzing incentives to seek Rule 11 penalties when
information about the merits is uncertain).
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that choice clearly is contrary to settled experience or strong and reliable anecdotal evidence. In this case, a theoretical analysis of error
and process costs supports a merits review, and neither experience
nor anecdote strongly contradicts this conclusion.
IV. AN EXAMPLE: CARIDAD V. METRO-NORTH
COMMUTER RAILROAD
The Second Circuit’s decision in Caridad v. Metro-North Com236
muter Railroad illustrates the many failings of the Eisen rule and the
advantages of an approach that considers the merits at the certification stage. The district court in Caridad denied the plaintiffs’ motion
237
to certify after considering expert evidence on a central issue. The
Second Circuit reversed, not because it disagreed with the district
court’s evaluation of the evidence, but instead because it objected to
238
the district court considering evidence at all. The Second Circuit
held that it was impermissible for the district court to consider “statistical dueling” at the class certification stage.239 And it reached this
conclusion even though the dueling was over issues that directly pertained to the certification requirements of Rule 23.240
Caridad already has had a significant impact. So far, the opinion
has been cited in eight cases in the Second Circuit as a basis for re241
jecting defendants’ opposition to class certification. The most significant of these cases is In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust
Litigation,242 in which the plaintiffs obtained certification of a class of
four million retailers for an antitrust suit against the VISA and
MasterCard associations. The district judge relied heavily on Caridad
to conduct only a cursory examination of the expert evidence on the
236. 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
237. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
238. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292–93.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 198 F.R.D. 325, 330–34 (D. Conn. 2001); In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7303, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2001);
Reynolds v. Giuliani, 118 F. Supp. 2d 352, 387–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Hirschfeld v. Stone, 193
F.R.D. 175, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192
F.R.D. 68, 78–80 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Saddle Rock Partners, Ltd. v. Hiatt, No. 96 Civ. 9474, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11931, at *6, *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2000); Brown v. Giuliani, No. 98 Civ.
7743, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8889, *5–*9 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2000); Stevelman v. Alias Research, Inc., No. 5:91-cv-682, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115, at *6–*7, *23–*24 (D. Conn. June 22,
2000).
242. 192 F.R.D. 68 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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certification issues243—and he did this despite expressed concern
about the strength of the liability theories and the “enormous financial risks for the defendants.”244 On appeal, a three-judge panel of the
Second Circuit affirmed over a stinging dissent, with the majority
following the district judge in relying on Caridad to bar a serious
merits review.245 In addition to its direct precedential impact, Caridad
also likely has had indirect effects that are much more difficult to
document: discouraging serious opposition to class certification and
encouraging precertification settlement. We choose Caridad as an illustration because of its importance and because one of us (Evans)
was an expert witness in the case and is familiar with its details.246
A. Background
Twenty-five former employees of Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North) sued Metro-North for injunctive relief,
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.247 These
plaintiffs alleged that Metro-North discriminated against African248
American employees in its promotion and disciplinary decisions.
They sought to represent a class consisting of all African-American
employees of Metro-North during the period 1983 to 1996.249
243. Id. at 79, 85. The VISA court noted that Caridad was “the Second Circuit’s latest word”
on the question of considering the merits at the certification stage and as a result that it warranted “an extended discussion.” Id. at 79.
244. Id. at 89. The district judge even went so far as to recommend that the Second Circuit
take an interlocutory appeal of the certification decision:
This litigation poses enormous financial risks for the defendants, risks that are obviously increased drastically by certification of the class. Moreover, this certification
motion raises substantial and novel questions involving the standards a district court
should apply in evaluating a class motion and the interaction of those standards with
antitrust principles.
Id.
245. In re VISA Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
22480, at *17–*20 (2d Cir. Oct. 17, 2001). Judge Jacobs, dissenting, argued that given the “coercive” settlement pressure that an erroneous certification creates, the district judge should not
have certified without first being sure there was a practical means for trying the case, and he
also reprimanded the district court judge for using the Eisen rule to avoid deciding how to
measure injury-in-fact. Id. at *57–*91 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
246. David Evans served as a statistical expert for Metro-North. National Economic Research Associates (NERA) and Evans also are consultants to VISA in the VISA
Check/MasterMoney case. We should make clear, however, that this Article is the independent
work of the authors and no client of NERA has contributed any funding or other assistance to
the project.
248. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
248. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
249. Id.
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Throughout the relevant period, Metro-North had written nondiscrimination policies and formal procedures for promotion and discipline, including hearing and appeal rights for disciplinary sanc250
tions. Plaintiffs conceded that these policies and procedures were
nondiscriminatory and in fact well designed to guard against discrimination.251 Plaintiffs claimed, however, that Metro-North delegated responsibility to individual supervisors without adequate oversight and
that this practice created a work environment that allowed for arbitrary and subjective decisionmaking and opened the door to employ252
ment outcomes biased against African Americans.
The class that plaintiffs sought to represent included all AfricanAmerican employees in all thirty-seven departments and 220 job posi253
tions throughout the company. To satisfy the typicality and commonality requirements for certification of a company-wide class,254
plaintiffs had to show that Metro-North “discriminated against class
members in some general fashion”;255 in other words, that the discriminatory practices reflected discrimination at the company level.256
Without such a showing, discrimination would be only a localized
phenomenon confined to particular supervisors or departments and
would have to be challenged on a more localized level, perhaps
through individual suits or smaller class actions limited to specific departments.
To establish company-wide discrimination, plaintiffs relied on
expert reports from a statistician and a sociologist, as well as anecdo257
tal evidence. The sociological and anecdotal evidence played only a
minor role; the District Court and Court of Appeals focused mainly
on the statistical report, which they treated as the essential core of the
certification analysis.258 The plaintiffs’ statistical report used a regres-

250. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 286–87 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
the May 14, 1996 Report of Dr. Harriet Zellner).
251. Robinson, 175 F.R.D. at 49.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 47.
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (3).
255. Robinson, 175 F.R.D. at 48.
256. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982). For a discussion of the Falcon case and its impact on class certification, see supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
257. Robinson, 175 F.R.D. at 48–49.
258. Id.; Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999).
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sion model to isolate race-based effects.259 With respect to discipline,
for example, plaintiffs’ expert found that African Americans were
disciplined three and one-half times more frequently than whites and
260
that this difference was highly significant statistically. She estimated
that a difference this large would occur by chance less than one time
in ten thousand and concluded that the result supported plaintiffs’
261
allegations.
Metro-North’s expert objected that the regression model combined all the data for the various Metro-North departments, positions, locations, and jobs, and calculated a racial differential for the
262
company as a whole. Combining disparate data in this way obscured
localized distinctions and made it impossible to detect differences
across departments, positions, locations, and other relevant factors—
even if such differences were pervasive.263 In effect, the model
averaged all the differences together to deliver a single “companywide” result and therefore could not indicate whether African
Americans were being disciplined more than whites in one
department, two locations, three job titles, or the entire company.
These expert positions remained essentially unchanged through264
out the several rounds of affidavits, replies, and rebuttals. The plaintiffs’ expert insisted that only a company-wide analysis using regression methods could determine if there was a racial difference at the
company level, while the defendant’s expert continued to object on
the ground that the statistical model assumed rather than proved a
single company-wide effect.265 The defendant’s expert also presented

259. The model assumed that there was a single difference between white and AfricanAmerican discipline rates across the entire company. That difference could be positive, negative, or zero. See Caridad, 191 F.3d at 288 (citing the May 14, 1996 Report of Dr. Harriet Zellner).
260. Id. Although there were important differences between the promotional and disciplinary analyses, we only discuss the disciplinary analysis here as the issues cited by the courts
were common to both.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Plaintiffs’ expert responded to the criticism by filing an affidavit presenting the results
of regression analyses run by department, thereby allowing for the possibility that racial differences in discipline rates could differ by department. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 289. But this analysis
only controlled for departments and did not test the significance of other race-neutral factors
such as job or location.
265. Id. at 288–89.
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his own analysis that showed substantial differences across various
groupings within the proposed class.266
B. District Court Decision
The district judge denied certification.267 He concluded that the
plaintiffs’ statistics were flawed because they combined data from
across the company in a way that did not permit testing for localized
effects:
[P]laintiffs’ statistics, even taken most favorably to plaintiffs, cannot
carry their burden here, because they fail to take account of the fact
that different Metro-North positions have materially different individual rates of discipline and of promotion associated with them. . . .
Unless these differences are taken into account, plaintiffs’ global sta268
tistics are meaningless.

The judge found that “when these differences are taken into account, no statistically significant racial disparities, either for discipline
or promotion, can be established with respect to the great majority of
the positions at Metro-North” and that “if there is any discrimination,
it is localized to a few positions and individuals, insufficient to support
269
a company-wide class.”
The district court’s approach is similar to the one we recommend
for our modest proposal. Before reaching his decision, the judge allowed the parties to take some discovery and gave them ample opportunity to dispute the expert evidence. He did not require that the
plaintiffs actually prove company-wide discrimination, only that they
provide statistical evidence to “meaningfully support” such an infer270
ence. We recommend a different formulation of the threshold standard—“likelihood of success” rather than “meaningfully support”—
but in either case the trial judge must probe the evidence to
determine whether the issues relevant to certification are sufficiently
strong to pass the threshold. In this regard, the district judge did not
assess the merits of the case as a whole. He instead focused on the
expert reports and statistical evidence bearing on the merits only

266. See id. (finding little difference in promotion rates by race when excluding jobs for
which the promotion rate was less than one percent).
267. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 175 F.R.D. 46, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
268. Id. at 48.
269. Id. at 48–49.
270. Id. at 49.
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insofar as it shed light on the certification issues, and in particular on
the pivotal Rule 23 issue of company-wide discrimination.
C. Court of Appeals Decision
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.271 The ground for reversal had nothing to do with the substance of the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ statistical
report was flawed. Indeed, the Court of Appeals itself expressed reservations about the plaintiffs’ ability to prove company-wide discrimination, noting in particular that the plaintiffs’ delegation theory
is “likely to be extremely difficult” to prove and might well require
more detailed statistical evidence.272 Instead, the Court, relying on
Eisen, objected to the district judge reaching the merits at all:273
Though Metro-North’s critique of the Class Plaintiffs’ evidence may
prove fatal at the merits stage, the Class Plaintiffs need not demonstrate at this stage that they will prevail on the merits. Accordingly,
this sort of “statistical dueling” is not relevant to the certification determination. . . . We conclude that the Class Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence supports a finding of commonality on the issue of discipline. . . . In addition, the statistical evidence supports a finding of
commonality on the promotion claim. . . . Here, the District Court
credited Metro-North’s expert evidence over that of the Class Plaintiffs. Such a weighing of the evidence is not appropriate at this stage
274
in the litigation.

The district court and the appeals court took very different approaches to the certification question. The district court examined the
plaintiffs’ statistical evidence with some care and assessed its sufficiency in light of the standards for class certification. The appeals
court, on the other hand, relied on Eisen to avoid this sort of examination. In the view of the appeals court, it was enough that plaintiffs
had advanced statistical evidence that appeared on its face to support
certification. That defendants disagreed with the sufficiency of the
statistical proof did not mean certification should be denied; any dis-

271. Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 283 (2d Cir. 1999).
272. Id. at 291.
273. Id. (citing Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 570–72 (2d Cir. 1982), which
stated that “a motion for class certification is not an occasion for examination of the merits of
the case”).
274. Id. at 292–93.
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agreement between experts constituted “statistical dueling” that
should be deferred until after certification.
D. Aftermath
Following the district court’s initial denial of certification, several
of the twenty-two named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed a number of
their claims, and Metro-North moved for summary judgment on most
of the remaining claims.275 The trial judge granted summary judgment
for all those claims that were time-barred or lacked sufficient evidence.276 After this, only seven of the original twenty-two plaintiffs
and only a few of the original claims remained in the case.277
After remand from the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs renewed
their motion to certify a class. The judge denied the motion once
again, this time on the ground that the requirements of Rule 23(b)
278
were not satisfied. The plaintiffs appealed that decision, and the
Second Circuit again reversed, instructing the district judge to certify
279
a class for at least part of the case. Finally, Metro-North settled all
the cases that survived summary judgment, although with an option
for the settling plaintiffs to rejoin the class should the district court’s
280
second denial be overturned on appeal (as in fact it was).
E. Conclusions and Lessons
The Second Circuit’s decision in Caridad reflects the unfortunate
legacy of Eisen. The practical result is to insulate almost any expert’s
statistical evidence from challenge at the certification stage and virtu-

275. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., No. 94 Civ. 7374, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 373, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1998) (listing the claims that were voluntarily withdrawn and the claims targeted for summary judgment).
276. Id. at *3–*33. Significantly, plaintiffs again submitted the same statistical report and
expert affidavits in support of their individual cases. However, the district judge rejected the
evidence on the ground that generalized statistics could not be used to overcome summary
judgment after the defendant made an individualized showing of nondiscriminatory reasons for
an employment decision. Id. at *29–*32.
277. Id. at *3.
278. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 197 F.R.D. 85, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
279. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162, 172 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that the compensatory damages requests do not necessarily preclude (b)(2) certification of the pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim and that bifurcation does not necessarily violate the Seventh Amendment). The Second Circuit did not address the Eisen issue in
this opinion, but it did cite Eisen to support the proposition that the appeal does not involve the
merits of the case. Id. at 163.
280. Robinson, 197 F.R.D. at 89–90.
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ally guarantee plaintiffs’ success in establishing certification requirements when they depend on such evidence. In the context of employment discrimination class actions like Caridad, this means almost
certain certification of a company-wide class even when the evidence
for company-wide discrimination is seriously flawed. This is a prescription for high error risks and a strong inducement to frivolous
class action suits.
Both the approach and the decision of the district court strike a
much better balance in line with the error-cost analysis in Part III of
this Article. First, the district judge minimized the likelihood of error
by focusing the inquiry and giving the parties a chance to conduct discovery and dispute the plaintiffs’ statistical report. Second, the balance of error costs favored the denial of certification on the evidence
before the court. Any error in denying certification still would leave
legitimate victims with ample alternatives to vindicate their claims.
For example, class members could seek certification of smaller classes
limited to more localized areas of discrimination, or pursue individual
claims separately or together with others as co-parties.
On the other hand, a grant of certification was very likely to be
erroneous. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies in
their statistical study and to obtain more compelling evidence of discrimination on the company level. Their inability or unwillingness to
do so at least raises doubts about the existence of such a broad-based
practice. So too, the fact that only some of the claims of only seven of
the original twenty-two plaintiffs remained after summary judgment
reinforces these doubts, and also raises questions about the viability
of the individual claims.281 Indeed, this dismal summary judgment record, although not decisive on the point, at least suggests a strategy
aimed at using class certification to leverage settlements for frivolous
or weak cases.
As we have discussed, the mere certification of a class action
makes settlement likely by shifting a tremendous amount of bargain-

281. A number of claims were dismissed because the plaintiffs did not present any specific
evidence at all to counter the particularized nondiscriminatory reasons Metro-North offered for
its employment actions. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., No. 94 Civ. 7374, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 373, at *2 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1998). Moreover, for some of the other
claims, the plaintiffs’ evidence was blatantly inadequate. Id. at *31 n.10. In fact, the trial judge
made a point of noting that “[t]he analysis undertaken on this [summary judgment] motion has
served . . . to confirm the Court’s view that the claims alleged in the instant Complaint are, for
the most part, entirely discrete and unrelated to one another, and thereby singularly inappropriate to support a class action.” Id. at *16 n.5.
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ing power to the plaintiffs. Caridad itself illustrates the stark difference for the exposure that defendants face when a case is certified
and when it is not. With certification, Metro-North may face claims
for many millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages
plus attorneys’ fees.
The Second Circuit’s refusal to allow an inquiry into the merits
can be explained only on the assumption that the court believed erroneous grants of certification were preferable to erroneous denials.
This assumption, in turn, seems predicated on a belief that faulty statistics can be detected later in a case and probably also on a sense that
assessing the validity of statistics is too difficult at the class certification stage. These considerations are seriously misguided. Faulty statistics never will be detected if the class action settles after certification—as most class actions do. Moreover, an examination of
statistical evidence is often quite manageable at the certification
stage, especially as the trial judge’s task is limited to evaluating a
threshold standard rather than rendering a final decision. Indeed, the
trial judge in Caridad did not seem overly burdened by the task.
In sum, granting certification in Caridad created a substantial
risk that frivolous claims would be rewarded, whereas denying certification was likely to save judicial resources in the long run and avoid
socially undesirable settlement incentives without depriving legitimate victims of the opportunity to vindicate their claims. The result of
the district court’s certification denials in Caridad shows the benefits:
Metro-North was able to test the merits of individual claims through
summary judgment without risking enormous liability, and plaintiffs
whose cases survived summary judgment were able to obtain reasonable settlements.
V. THE AMBITIOUS PROPOSAL: A MERITS REVIEW FOR ALL CASES
The previous analysis clearly supports our modest proposal that
judges be required to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits
insofar as necessary to evaluate properly Rule 23’s certification requirements. Rule 23 calls for a “rigorous analysis” of each certifica282
tion requirement. Moreover, as we have seen, some of those requirements, such as commonality, typicality, predominance, and

282. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (noting that a
class action may be certified only “if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied”).
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superiority, call on the court to predict the likely litigation path of the
lawsuit, and this kind of prediction often requires an evaluation of the
strength of issues on the facts of the case. The Eisen rule, in effect,
imposes an independent constraint on the scope of the certification
inquiry in the name of avoiding prejudice, maintaining procedural purity, reducing errors, and conserving litigation resources. Such a constraint might be an acceptable gloss on Rule 23 if its purported benefits were clear and substantial enough. But they are not.
Our policy arguments also have broader implications. The errorand process-cost analysis supports our more ambitious proposal that
judges conduct a merits review as part of every certification decision
regardless of whether merits-related issues are directly relevant to a
certification requirement. Limited precertification discovery would be
allowed on all the salient issues in the case, and the trial judge would
make and justify a determination whether class members’ substantive
claims have a significant likelihood of success. The merits inquiry
need not be elaborate or extensive. The goal would be to avoid certifying class actions when the class claims are all substantively frivolous
or extremely weak.
All the elements of the policy analysis developed in Part III apply with equal force to this broader proposal. A preliminary screening
of the merits in all class actions will help deter frivolous suits by controlling abuse of the settlement leverage certification creates. Moreover, the various factors we discussed limit the error costs associated
with false certification denials. Thus, our ambitious proposal is a considerable improvement over the current approach, which ignores the
merits and invites frivolous and weak class action suits.
Whether the proposal is optimal is more difficult to determine. A
merits screening generates costs, but the other principal approaches,
such as strict pleading and penalties for frivolous filings, do so as well.
For example, strict pleading, which requires class plaintiffs to plead
claims in detail, creates error costs by making it harder for meritorious plaintiffs to file legitimate class action suits and also increases
283
process costs by inviting more motions to dismiss. Moreover, because penalties must be set quite high to have a substantial impact on
filing incentives, the use of a penalty approach can deter risk-averse
plaintiffs from filing meritorious suits, and because hearings must
precede the imposition of penalties, process costs can rise as well.284
283.
284.

See, e.g., Bone, supra note 149, at 587–89 (describing the costs of strict pleading).
See id. at 589–93 (evaluating the case for Rule 11 penalties).
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Although the paucity of empirical evidence makes it difficult to
determine the precise combination of devices that strikes the best
cost-benefit balance, preliminary merits screening is attractive enough
and a substantial enough improvement over the status quo to warrant
implementation, either on its own or in conjunction with other ap285
proaches. As courts gain experience with merits screening in practice, they will have a basis to make improvements that enhance the
cost-benefit balance—by adjusting the scope of precertification discovery, altering the threshold level of likelihood of success, or tinkering with other features. Experience also can provide insight into the
mix of different approaches best designed to deter frivolous class action suits.
CONCLUSION
Ever since the Supreme Court decided the Eisen case, the federal
courts have struggled to make certification decisions without inquiring too deeply into the merits. The result, as we have seen, is a confused and misguided body of case law. When a judge wishes to avoid
difficult evidentiary issues, to pressure a settlement, or to further his
own policy views, he easily can ignore the merits and certify a class by
relying on the Eisen rule. When a judge would rather examine the
merits to screen out frivolous suits, he must confront the Eisen rule
and somehow deal with its bar. The result is a practice of certification
that generates high social costs over the long run, costs that are easily
overlooked when deciding a particular case.
It is, therefore, time to abolish the Eisen rule. We have shown
that the rule is not required by Rule 23 itself or justified by the Eisen
Court’s concern with the prejudicial effect of a preliminary merits review. Nor is the rule mandated by a proper understanding of the substance/procedure dichotomy or by basic principles fundamental to the
framework established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most
disturbing of all, the Eisen rule provides fertile ground for frivolous
suits and unjustified settlements that create substantial error costs.

285. Merits screening has the advantage of targeting frivolous suits directly rather than indirectly through incentive effects that can have a deleterious impact on meritorious suits. Moreover, the fact that screening happens before certification means that its effects are less likely to
be blunted by settlement. Finally, error and process costs can be reduced by controlling the
scope of precertification discovery and adjusting the threshold likelihood of success standard.
Cf. id. at 593–96 (recommending judicial screening as a superior device to strict pleading, penalties, and fee-shifting for deterring frivolous suits outside the class action setting).
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As our discussion of the Caridad case demonstrates, there are
substantial advantages to abandoning the Eisen rule and allowing a
preliminary inquiry into the evidence and the merits. This is certainly
true for our modest proposal, where merits-related issues are relevant
to certification requirements. A party should be required to show a
threshold likelihood of success before relying on an issue as part of
the certification analysis. Moreover, trial judges should do whatever is
necessary to evaluate each certification requirement rigorously. When
this evaluation involves making a preliminary determination of the
merits of claims or issues, the judge should make the necessary determinations explicitly and explain why, in light of the evidence, each
certification requirement is or is not met. It might be tempting for the
judge to skirt over technical and complex evidence or to certify when
certification seems to be the only hope for plaintiffs with small claims,
especially when settlement insulates a questionable decision from appellate review. But doing so is not only costly; it also is contrary to the
intent and purpose of Rule 23.
In addition, we have demonstrated that the policy arguments favor our more ambitious reform. The error- and process-cost analysis
supports a merits review as part of every certification decision
whether or not merits-related issues are directly relevant to a specific
certification requirement. Class certification should be granted only if
the judge is persuaded, on a preliminary evidentiary review, that the
individual suits comprising the class are not substantively frivolous or
very weak on the merits.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules currently is considering
revisions to Rule 23 and easily could include our proposals among its
recommendations. The Committee has considered similar provisions
286
in the past but never adopted them. Its refusal to act then was a mistake, and it now has an opportunity to correct the error.
Civil litigation is a complex strategic environment that challenges
our powers of prediction and analysis. Because of this, we must be especially careful to evaluate costs as well as benefits and adjust our
procedural rules in light of changing conditions and practical experience. The Eisen rule was adopted without serious attention to its
286. See, e.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 34, at 28–30 (discussing a proposed Rule 23 revision considered by the Committee in 1995 and 1996 that would have required trial judges to
consider the likely success of the class action before certification); see also Berry, supra note 4,
at 323, 334–37 (describing a bill, developed with the help of the Justice Department and introduced before Congress in 1978, that would have revised class action practice to include, among
other things, a preliminary assessment of the merits).
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costs, and it no longer serves a class action world dominated by settlement. Overturning Eisen will not cure all class action problems, but
it will make the class action a more effective tool for achieving efficiency and enforcing substantive rights. That would be an important
step forward.

